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Title of Thesis: Heidegger and the Humanities: Employing Language as a
Technology in English Studies Pedagogy

Degree: Master of Arts

Year This Degree Granted: 2003

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Heidegger and the Humanities: Employing Language as an Instrument in English
Studies Pedagogy

by

Kirsten Anne Martin



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of English

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 2003

University of Alberta

Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled “Heidegger and the Humanities: Employing Language as a Technology in English Studies Pedagogy,” submitted by Kirsten Anne Martin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

This thesis is dedicated to my father, James Richard Martin, and to my supervisor, Robert James Merrett, both of whom encouraged me to write for myself, yes, but *properly*. Thank you.

Abstract

The first section states that this thesis has two aims, first, to show English Studies in Canadian universities as being in crisis pedagogically. Professors model English Studies after the natural sciences to further social equality but inadvertently fix on present concerns, discouraging students from reading widely and writing expansively. The second is to offer English Studies in Canada—not a perfect solution to the crisis of pedagogy—but a way of teaching reading and writing as shaping and being shaped by students, so that English Studies might show its value. The second section discusses how Heidegger's philosophy in particular might suggest such a way of reading and writing to English Studies. The final section reads Arnold, Emberley, and Pocklington and Tupper on the universities, and Heidegger's philosophy on the as yet undefined role of English Studies within them. There is also an annotated list of works consulted.

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1.0 Methods

1.1 Mastering modesty

G. K. Chesterton once commented,

‘Poor, poor little Alice! [...] She has not only been taught and made to do lessons; she has been forced to inflict lessons on others. Alice is now not only a schoolgirl but a schoolmistress [...] There will be lots and lots of examination papers, with questions like: (1) What do you know of the following; mimsy, gimble, haddocks’ eyes, treacle-wells, beautiful soup? (2) Record all the moves in the chess game in *Through the Looking-Glass*, and give diagrams. (3) Outline the practical policy of the White Knight for dealing with the social problem of green whiskers. (4) Distinguish between Tweedledum and Tweedledee.’¹

Chesterton accepted as a fact of everyday experience that the brain comes fully equipped to learn, and that the brain that has been “taught and made to do lessons” will be compelled by them, and also impelled to offer them to other brains, either formally or informally, so joining the days, weeks, months, years, decades, and centuries in something like a great “chess game.” Thus he would not have complained that professors distract undergraduate students, with lessons and examination papers, from passing an endless “golden afternoon.”² Instead, rejecting the truth-value of a biological sciences model of knowledge, he would have complained that lessons and examination papers based on that model—specifically, those that purport to be about fiction—typically fail to so distract undergraduate students. Lessons and examination papers that purport to be about fiction engage professors in the leisure of transmitting, and undergraduate

students, the leisure of acquiring, facts about men and women rather than engaging everyone in the hard work of seeking out metaphor and nuance.

Post-graduation, many students undertake gainful employment outside of the university. Others undertake further studies in English. A majority of professors and graduate students assumes that, having taken lessons and written examination papers, it has received the truth. Feminists, post-colonialists, lists of –ists make their beliefs explicit to one another in their writings; or encourage one another to consider these beliefs as implicit in their writings; but, either way, they view themselves as part of an academic community of rebels against falsehood. But there are professors and graduate students in English who, while they would not be here if they did not view themselves as part of an academic community, are not keen rebels of the sorts feminist, post-colonialist. For example, *this* student passed childhood in reading books such as *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Alice Through the Looking-Glass*; submitted the waning years of childhood, more or less willingly, to learning what all of that reading had meant, to lessons and examination papers of the sort that Chesterton worked up into sheer nonsense, to English Studies; took those lessons and examination papers more or less seriously; and has now agreed to provide the proof of that process and of the continued correct attitude toward knowledge, in a research thesis. Yet this student never quite grew accustomed to feminisms and post-colonialisms telling *her* who and what *she* is, or to speaking and writing about this thing called “herself,” as though there were nothing in the world but men and women and black and white and war. So this student is not a rebel if the definition of the word is a feminist, a

post-colonialist. Neither is this student a rebel simply because she refuses to be a feminist, a post-colonialist. If this student can be termed a rebel at all, it is for the following reason: She spent a degree's worth of time in learning *about* "the room [...] through the glass," where the books "are something like our books, only the words go the wrong way," only to become keenly aware that she no longer knows anything *of* that room and those books, if ever she did, and that she, as a member of English Studies, taken as a community of rebels against falsehood, cannot accept as the truth that there is nothing but men and women and black and white and war, that there is nothing of fiction.³ Chesterton inspires the renewed commitment to learn by doing, to learn of literary language by reading and writing it—which conforms to rather than rebels against the correct attitude toward knowledge, no?

1.2 Aims

This student's thesis aims to reveal a crisis in English Studies in Canada: When professors teach literature as nothing more than that which literary criticism deconstructs, they do not, as they believe, further the study of literature or social equality. Speaking practically, when professors teach literature as nothing more than that which literary criticism deconstructs, they teach students to read and write unethically, that is, in a way that reproduces present concerns and inadvertently hampers social equality. Students' arguments tend to confront the impossibility of full articulation—of accounting for everything that has been and will be thought out on paper—by blindly defending solutions anyway, and even straightaway. But this student's thesis is hardly prepared to defend one perfect

solution in which professors of literature develop students' ability to read and write ethically. Instead, this thesis negotiates between its commitment to the study of fiction and its skepticism toward English Studies as it is presently taught.

This thesis reads Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy*, Peter Emberley's *Zero Tolerance*, and Allan Tupper's and Tom Pocklington's *No Place to Learn*, in sequence. This thesis grounds its criticisms in Martin Heidegger's philosophy, mainly, "The Question Concerning Technology" and "Traditional Language and Technological Language." This thesis has two aims with regard to Heidegger's philosophy, the first of which is rhetorical. English Studies assumes that Heidegger's Nazism, as opposed to their feminism, post-colonialism, and other -isms, is implicit in his writings, and that he is worth reading only as a Nazi, or through Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, who supposedly improve him and make him relevant to English Studies. The first section on Heidegger, by asking "Why on earth do you want to read Heidegger," questions English Studies' use of Heidegger either way in reproducing the world of present concerns, and suggests how English Studies might go about reading and writing Heidegger's philosophy ethically. The second aim is to offer up Heidegger's way of reading and writing ethically, so as to allow the world beyond present concerns to reveal itself. The second section focusses on Heidegger's thoughts on language. In short, this thesis uses Heidegger seriously, not only to make a case for reading and writing ethically, but also rhetorically, as a case in point for English Studies.

So, to clarify: This student does not genuflect to Heidegger or aim to bulwark her thesis from criticism. Heidegger's writing is, not prophetic, but only

philosophic, prompting the use of language, not in the rapid-fire production of theoretical identities, but, rather, in the “the care, development and preservation of the humanness, the humanity, of the human being,” of untold social equality, so that this thesis is responsible for conducting itself ethically, and Heidegger is responsible for his failures to so conduct himself.⁴ This student’s thesis does not aim to make an illuminating contribution to philosophy, or even to draw English Studies toward the illuminating contribution that is philosophy. The word “philosophically” is not necessarily limited to the discipline of philosophy. It is possible to ask the question why read Heidegger philosophically—or, in a way that builds instead of deconstructs—but as an illuminating contribution to English Studies, which is intelligible to English Studies without recourse to another discipline’s methods in total and as such. This student’s thesis uses Heidegger to show how English Studies might go about reading whatever it is that challenges hard thinking.

This student’s thesis also challenges itself to Heidegger’s understanding that writing differently—whatever its respective entailments for students and for professors—entails rejecting, as unsound, the logic of the traditional argument, whereby solutions are defensible as perfect.⁵ This thesis, modelling itself as Heideggerian, aims—in the second case, or “ultimately”—to prompt professors’ questioning, for themselves, in what new ways they might teach English Studies so as to enable students’ reading and writing to be useful to Canadian society and, more generally, the world.

This student understands that the conventions for theses are at odds with this thesis' aims. This thesis must, not only state its aims, but also repeat them. To put it another way, this thesis must state that it aims to reveal a crisis in English Studies in Canada; to reveal Heidegger's philosophy to English Studies; to offer Heidegger's way of reading fiction to English Studies; and to do so in a way that allows possibilities to reveal themselves, instead of in a way that reduces argumentation to a series of steps in one direction; but also give a little to convention, by being clear about what it is doing as it is doing it. Because this student prefers to spell things out for herself than to have them spelled out for her, and because this thesis has certain aims, the style of writing tends toward obliquity. But it is worth noting that this thesis does not invent oblique writing: Although it was relatively recently that Matthew Arnold set about to concretise the essayistic professional model for what would become English Studies, he traced that model back at least to the turn of the eighteenth century and John Dryden.

This student's thesis is a compromise between convention and innovation in research: Although it is in the English language; it uses Ss more often than Zs, and Us more often than not; it draws from various sources, including fiction as well as scholarly publications; and it adheres to MLA conventions for research papers, wherever they apply; it also refuses to pretend that it prints out the *one true path* to its sources, as though there were no other ways and no other sources to consider. This student's thesis—speaking through a source here, and arguing with it there, all more or less arbitrarily—might be considered as an exercise in

reading and writing, in which to travel forward and backward and sideways and, perhaps, three times, light of lessons about right and wrong and directions, and the point of which is, not to react to literary language in a particular way, but simply to learn how to respond to it. –Then again, maybe not. No one Master’s thesis gets to decide what is the Master’s thesis. Whatever is the case, this thesis is readable: The first letter of the first word following a colon is capitalised, so as to break long sentences up; the introduction functions, not to determine the full text, but to open the way to it; the body, to set up a logical progression of thought, not to fix it in time, but to show its instability over time; and the conclusion, not to totalise, but to leave English Studies pedagogy in Canada open to further questioning.⁶ The whole of the text is organised into sections instead of into chapters, in order to facilitate re-reading; these sections are conveniently listed in the Table of Contents; and the bibliography is annotated, not to inscribe works consulted, but to encourage fresh readings of them. In short, this thesis—believing that the worst crisis of thought occurs in the absence of questioning—attempts to view the crisis at various angles, as from atop a prospect. This thesis starts at the beginning, to ready the way to a space in which to imagine “as many as six impossible things before breakfast.”⁷

1.3 How is it Possible to Study Fiction?

Consider the fact that humans are unable to digest cellulose. Consider also that many a reader of Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventure’s in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass* will avow that these books have had a curious influence on him or her, such that he or she is able to fit through a space as small as a margin,

and into print. And the books make a good step-up, too. Facts are besides the books' positive nutritive influence on readers. The trained brain, the critic, must learn that the best way to take a fact is often by surprise: What sense does it make to "outline the practical polic[ies]" of an inventor-knight, who explains his status as such in terms of mind-body dualism, and who believes that the social problem of green whiskers is solved by dying whiskers green in the first place and covering them with a fan in the second? What sense does it make to outline the practical policies of fiction? 'What—is—this [Alice]?'⁸

An answer to that question lies in the story:

'Well, now that we *have* seen each other,' said the Unicorn, 'if you'll believe in me, I'll believe in you. Is that a bargain?'

'Yes, if you like,' said Alice.⁹

According to the passage above, Alice is the child whose material existence a Unicorn confirms. But what sense does it make to call real a child whose existence a Unicorn confirms? According to traditional sentential analysis, "Alice met a unicorn" is a true proposition of the form "I met *x*" in which "a unicorn" is the subject. But a Unicorn is at once the animal whose material existence Alice confirms and, by all factual accounts, a "fabulous monster."¹⁰ Bertrand Russell attended to the main "difficult[y] which seem[s] unavoidable if we regard denoting phrases as standing for genuine constituents of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur," that is, the creation of unreality, or an object in language where none corresponds in reality.¹¹ An analysis that matches the proposition "I met a unicorn" to "I met *x*" "fall[s] into the error of admitting [an]

unrealit[y] [...] as [an] object described.” In other words, to consider “a unicorn” as being a constituent of the proposition—as “a subordinate group having a meaning of its own”—is to consider it as referring to a thing. As Russell put it, “we find ourselves saddled with ‘a unicorn,’ and with the problem how there can be such a thing in a world where there are no unicorns.” Russell rejected, as a pseudo-solution to the problem of unreal or pseudo-objects, conferring on them “some kind of logical being.” He understood that “logic [...] must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned with the real world [...] though with its more abstract and general features.” Russell’s “correct analysis” of “Alice met a unicorn” would be $(\exists x)(x \text{ is a unicorn and Alice met } x)$, or “The proposition ‘ x is a unicorn and Alice met x ’ is not always false.” In other words, “a unicorn” is nothing more or less than a phrase operating within a description. That the proposition “Alice met a unicorn” is significant is not the same as that it posits the material existence of a unicorn—or of an Alice, for that matter.¹²

Remember that the Caterpillar interrogates Alice:

‘Who are *You*?’¹³

Russell’s sentential analysis unsettles every brain that has ever defended the reading of books. Particularly unsettling is his claim that to say “Hamlet [...] exists in his own world, namely in the world of Shakespeare’s imagination, just as truly as (say) Napoleon existed in the ordinary world, is to say something deliberately confusing, or else confused to a degree which is scarcely credible.” The trained brain will here grab hold of Russell’s contrary suggestion that an author’s “thoughts [...] are real. So are the thoughts that we have in reading.” The

brain will ask, where else but in imaginative literature *can* anything that is unreal, or thought to be unreal, exist? But the brain must here admit that it, as much as is Russell, is responsible for submitting fiction to facts. To say, “Where else but in imaginative literature *can* anything that is unreal, or thought to be unreal, exist?” is not to defend fiction from facts. On the other hand, “How else but by imaginative literature can anything that is unreal, or believed to be unreal, come into existence?” allows fiction and facts to abide one another, within the domain of the real. To say that something that is unreal, or believed to be unreal, may come into existence “by” thoughts is a very different thing than to say that it comes into existence “in” thoughts. Concepts are intangible: Although they are real enough to play a role in the human world, they do not suffice to form and populate that world. Although the proposition “Alice met a unicorn” is significant; although there is something more familiar about Alice than about a unicorn; and although it is easier to imagine an Alice, a real-world object, than a unicorn, an invented one; Alice is, like a unicorn, still a fabulous monster. There is no such thing as “the Alice,” only this or that Alice, and the Alice of Carroll’s books is no schoolgirl or girl, schoolmistress or textbook, whose material existence either the proposition “Alice met a unicorn,” or any living person, can confirm. “Alice” is but a phrase. That fact does not disappoint fiction, which never aimed to prove the existence of an “objective [Alice],” either in the “one [...] real world,” or in some other world.¹⁴

It is clearer now that the claim that Alice is real, that Alice is anything but *literary*, is disappointing. For that claim does not confront the facts, does not

inflict personhood on a phrase. Instead, the claim that Alice is real is “a most pitiful and paltry evasion” of the facts, which inflicts a false lesson on the trained brain.¹⁵ Although fiction is something that can be studied in some fashion; and although the critic can sometimes “learn more about [reality] from [fiction] than [...] from many straightforwardly constative historical texts”; for the critic to continue to believe that fiction can and ought to be studied as though it were an elusively historical text, without any consideration of its elusiveness, is simultaneously to disbelieve in the power of imagination. For the critic to study fiction as though it “admit[s] of being institutionalised into a teachable series of statements or propositions” is to admit the defeat of imagination.¹⁶ The trained brain does not need for Alice to confirm or deny that it lives. What it might set about to study in Alice’s “generally [giving] herself very good advice” but “very seldom follow[ing] it”—and in fiction in general—is neither the advice itself, nor her uses and abuses of it, but that she *plays* with it.¹⁷ All of lessons, advice, and logic combine to make a mess of, and play with “the Rules of Battle” combine to make an adventure of, Alice’s life.¹⁸ Perhaps, then, it is possible to read Alice, without inflicting personhood on her and a false lesson on the brain, as a sort of adventure herself. Perhaps it is possible, in the institutionalised reading of literature, not only to exhaust meaning, but also, like Alice, to play with meanings:

‘Well, I’ll eat it,’ said Alice, ‘and if it makes me grow larger, I can reach the key; and if it makes me grow smaller, I can creep under the door: so either way I’ll get into the garden, and I don’t care which happens!’¹⁹

There is more than one institutionalised way of reading. The institutionalised reading of literature entails the writing of literary criticism, which is not literature itself, but purports to explain literature. Similarly, the institutionalised reading of philosophy entails the writing of philosophical criticism, which is not philosophy itself, but purports to explain philosophy. Literary criticism and philosophical criticism assume that their respective objects are explainable, and worthwhile explaining—or, for that matter, explaining away, as pulp and propaganda. Philosophical criticism and literary criticism may have some relevance to one another.

1.4 How is it possible to study Martin Heidegger?

Alice had,

once or twice [,] peeped into the book her sister was reading, but it had no pictures or conversations in it, ‘and what is the use of a book,’ thought Alice, ‘without pictures or conversations?’²⁰

Alice’s question sounds silly to the brain that has been taught and made to do lessons in philosophy. Some of the best books have neither pictures nor “conversations” of the kind to which Alice refers. But consider the apparently acceptable question “Why on earth do you want to read *that*?” At bottom, the questions “‘What is the use of a book [...] without pictures or conversations?’” and “‘Why on earth do you want to read *that*?’” are identical. To explain: “‘What is the use of a book without pictures or conversations?’” assumes that a book’s worth, instead of lying in itself, lies in its usefulness, namely, in its ability to please someone. Alice likes pictures and conversations, and considers as pointless

any book that does not contain them. Likewise, “Why on earth do you want to read *that*?” assumes that a book’s worth, instead of lying in itself, lies in its usefulness. The brain that asks the question “Why on earth do you want to read *that*?” is assuming that “you” would only be reading “that” book, or any book at all, if you wanted to read it, in other words, if it pleased you in some way, just for example, by presenting you with pictures and conversations. In many instances, it is possible to answer the question “Why on earth do you want to read *that*?” satisfactorily, that is, along the lines of “I want to read this book because it pleases me to do so.” But what happens when “that” does not present you with pictures and conversations? Specifically, what happens when “that” is Heidegger?

English Studies assumes that Heidegger’s Nazism is implicit in his writings, and that he is relevant to English Studies only as a non-feminist, non-post-colonialist Nazi, or via Foucault and Derrida. It is apparently possible to answer the question “Why on earth do you want to read Heidegger?” in a few ways: One way is to acknowledge an error in judgement, as in “I don’t know what I was thinking; it doesn’t please me to read Heidegger; of course I don’t want to read Heidegger anymore.” Other ways involve focussing on Heidegger’s political choices, as in either of “I want to read Heidegger because anti-Semitism pleases me” and “I want to read Heidegger because it pleases me to spend my time in constructing arguments against anti-Semitism.” Still another way is to confess, as in “I want to read Heidegger because it pleases me to do so,” to the academic perversity of *wanting to be aggravated, bullied, and, in short, confused.*

‘I’m sure those are not the right words,’ said poor Alice, and her eyes filled with tears again as she went on, ‘I must be Mabel after all, and I shall have to go and live in that poky little house, and have next to no toys to play with, and oh, ever so many lessons to learn!’²¹

This student has had opportunity to react to, and further opportunity to act on, the question “Why on earth do you want to read Heidegger?” There is something worse than silly and frustrating—something dangerous—about a question that forces the brain to choose between “I want to read Heidegger because it pleases me to spend my time in constructing arguments against anti-Semitism,” and “I want to read Heidegger because I am an academic dimwit at best and a bad person at worst.” This student’s thesis will not make the choice between ethics and academics, but consider whether or not that choice is an artificial and misleading one. The question to ask is “Why on earth don’t you want me to read Heidegger?” It is worth considering philosophy’s Heidegger debate, not in order to contribute to it, but in order to understand how it is possible for everyone, in philosophy and English Studies alike, to read Heidegger, and to read in a way that builds instead of deconstructs. Victor Farias responded to the question “Why on earth don’t you want me to read Heidegger?” most energetically in his *Heidegger and Nazism*.

In traditional terms, “philosopher” refers to “one engaged or learned in philosophy or a branch of it,” or—what might be a more precise usage—“one who lives by philosophy or acts philosophically.” And “philosophy” refers to the philosopher’s “use of reason and argument in search for truth and knowledge of reality, especially of the causes and nature of things, and of the principles

governing existence, perception, human behaviour, and the material universe.”²²

Both definitions operate on the assumption that one’s stated intentions matter. But Farias noted that purportedly living by philosophy and searching for truth is insufficient to make a philosopher of one, or philosophy of one’s every scribbling. Instead, it is put to critics to ascribe, or refuse to ascribe, “philosopher” to one and “philosophy” to one’s writings. In Farias’ view, if one is a philosopher and one’s writings are philosophy, it is not because one deems it so, but because critics have deemed it so. For example, if Heidegger is a philosopher and his writings are philosophy, this is not because Heidegger, but because critics, have deemed it so.

Farias did not rest at the conclusion that, because critics have deemed that Heidegger is a philosopher and his writings are philosophy, this is so. In Farias’ view, critics had ascribed to Heidegger status as a philosopher, and to his writings, philosophy based on Heidegger’s claim that he lived by philosophy and searched for truth. According to Farias, critics may ascribe, or refuse to ascribe, “philosopher” to one and “philosophy” to one’s writings only with the understanding that “philosophical and political ideas [alike] bring us back not only to the world in which they exist but also the practical objectives of the person defending them.” In other words, one’s intentions are insufficient to make a philosopher of one, or philosophy of one’s writings, just until critics have managed to verify those intentions. Farias instructed critics to read “the available documents” concerning Heidegger’s politics, in terms of “the objective historical context,” his political choices, and “the systematic significance of his ideas.” Next, Farias instructed critics to read Heidegger’s politics into his philosophy, in

such a way as shows the latter to be an abuse of reason and argument, namely, propaganda, and Heidegger, a Nazi apologist. Farias was confident that, where critics had considered Heidegger's philosophy "on a purely abstract level," meaning, as a thing apart, which mitigates his support of and active participation in National Socialism, they would come to consider Heidegger's support of and active participation in National Socialism as casting into doubt his philosophy as such, and therefore his status as a philosopher.²³

Farias ostensibly intended to promote social equality, by stopping critics from reading Heidegger because Heidegger was a Nazi, and by ensuring that whatever critics continued to read Heidegger do so for the express, pleasurable purpose of revealing him as a Nazi apologist. Farias ostensibly had every good reason to condemn critics who continued to read Heidegger's philosophy as such.

'No, I've made up my mind about it: if I'm Mabel, I'll stay down here!

It'll be no use their putting their heads down and saying, 'Come up again, dear!' I shall only look up and say, 'Who am I, then? Tell me that first, and then, if I like being that person, I'll come up: if not, I'll stay down here till I'm somebody else.'

But critics who read Heidegger have a good reason to protest being condemned. In the present instance, the question is not "Who am I, then?" but something closer to

'Who are *You*?',²⁴

Farias may have been right that a book's worth, instead of lying in itself, lies in its usefulness. He may have been right that a book's worth lies in its

usefulness to critics. But can it be right that a book's usefulness to critics lies in its ability to *please* them? This thesis considers as *scarily overconfident* the view that the collective's intentions towards books are transparent, and good, and better than those of anyone else; that the critic's individual intentions can be 'mapped to' those of the collective; and that the critic is, therefore, fit to 'judge between' an author's stated and true intentions. In other words, this thesis considers as *scarily overconfident* the view that what pleases the critic must be the same thing as what makes a philosopher and philosophy, and what displeases the critic, what makes an apologist and propaganda.

'Serpent!' screamed the Pigeon.

'I'm *not* a serpent!' said Alice indignantly. 'Let me alone!'

'Serpent, I say again!' repeated the Pigeon.²⁵

Perhaps the Pigeon is a serpent, perhaps Farias was the Heidegger whom he feared, the "philosopher" who, instead of philosophising, instead of pursuing the truth, would tie philosophy to a personal politics, would limit philosophy to the reiteration of held truths. In other words, perhaps Farias was the worst kind of critic, namely, a sophist:

The Sophists took money for their more or less hairsplitting expoundings, and sophists of this kind have come and gone from time immemorial. I am referring to all the school-masters and self-opinionated know-it-alls who are satisfied with what little they know, or who boast of knowing a whole lot about subjects they haven't the faintest notion of.²⁶

Farias' hatred of fallibility was so strong, yet he condemned it everywhere but in himself. His brain was contented, after having first sorted out which conversations are pleasing and which, displeasing, to pass the time in reading only the former of them. Whereas it makes nonsense for the brain to confess to the academic perversity of *wanting to be aggravated, bullied, and, in short, confused*, it makes quite a lot of sense to say, "I don't want to be a critic if to be so is the same thing as to be a sophist." However, that response on its own is mere impertinence, and no end to the discussion of Heidegger. That Farias is a serpent does not diminish the possibility that Heidegger is one also. Alice's very silly question "'What is the use of a book without pictures and conversations?'" is here rephrased as "What is the use of Heidegger, which it displeases you to read?" where "you" is, not only Farias, but also other critics of philosophy.

For David Wood, "the task of philosophy is to disrupt any and every naturalization of the conjunction of the concept and the world, every unreflective naivety whether it leads [...] to fascism or foolishness."²⁷ In other words, philosophy is not designed to capitulate to brains, as though they produce perfectly sound and balanced criticism, but to assist brains, all of which are finite and err, in appreciating and working from their limits. If the brain of a critic of philosophy is specially equipped in some way, this is only to respect its capacity for error, and not to eliminate it. The brain, by meeting with a significant number of other brains in the room, and reading books, and learning something of the practice and history of philosophy, learns to measure its thoughts against a collective that, instead of representing the truth, brings commonly held truths into

conversation with one another and doubt. It might be put to Farias that the philosophic brain aims, not to find truth in philosophy, but by philosophy, so that philosophy is not the book but the use of a book, especially one that it is displeasing to read, in bringing held truths into doubt.

Similarly, although Farias' *Heidegger and Nazism* engages in sophism, and is arguably criticism of a lower quality, this is not to say that it is useless to critics of philosophy. Farias' book "is important because [,] for the first time, it [...] calls into immediate question the received or official version of Heidegger's link to Nazism," according to which Heidegger was no racist, a selfless defender of the German university, and a straightforwardly brilliant philosopher. Critics are responsible for reading Farias, not because Farias is correct in stating that Heidegger *always* "abandoned the discipline of serious philosophical inquiry for any more immediate political goal," but because no critic can be certain that Heidegger "never" did so.²⁸ The point of reading Farias is not to judge Heidegger, whose actions as a dead man cannot be held accountable to his actions as a living man. The point of reading Farias is to think about how it is possible to read Heidegger usefully. Unfortunately, many critics tend to purposefully *misuse* Farias' book, to their own advantage. Some of these critics ignore the flaws in Farias' analysis, in order to find in it a justification for not reading Heidegger. Other critics present Farias' analysis as being the solidest piece of anti-Heideggerianism, only so that they may exaggerate its flaws, and thereby justify reading Heidegger without considering his Nazism. For example, Paul Farwell holds that the relationship between Heidegger's politics and his philosophy is at

best a “debatable assumption,” yet does not consider his refusing to debate it as being negligent.²⁹ And Alex Argyros demeans debate: “much has been written on the subject, and nothing resembling a consensus has been reached.” He claims that his refusing to “indulge in speculation concerning the degree to which Heidegger’s affiliation with the Nazi Party [...] was a logical consequence of his thought or the mistake of a gullible and naïve philosopher floundering in political waters” is not negligent.³⁰ But Argyros might do well to consider that he *does* indulge in some speculation: Both of his examples assume, and disclaim, Heidegger’s affiliation with the Nazi party. Although Farias’ analysis is not itself good criticism—although it presents, as real, the artificial choice between ethics and academics—it may yet inspire good criticism. In other words, Farias’ analysis, when it is read in a philosophical spirit—when it is read as *philosophical* criticism—gestures toward the relationship between ethics and academics and puts due pressure on the brain to consider the extent of that relationship.

Is it ethical to read Heidegger as being a philosopher and his writings, philosophy? To say that Heidegger is not a philosopher and his writings are not philosophy *simply because* there is a slide between his intentions as he states them and his political choices, *simply because* he is fallible, and *simply because* other critics say so, certainly seems *unethical*, in the sense of relinquishing not only the right, but also the responsibility, of every brain, Heidegger included, to improve itself by philosophising. Perhaps, then, it is ethical to consider Heidegger as being a philosopher and his writings, philosophy, because to so consider him and his writings holds him, and every brain, to the best intentions. Still, there is the sense

that a philosopher is one who, having achieved a high level of reasoning and argumentation, is qualified, not only to seek truth and knowledge of reality, but also to lead toward it. A philosopher is one who is qualified, more so than Farias, to lead toward truth and knowledge and reality. But

suddenly a white rabbit with pink eyes [runs] close by.³¹

Hannah Arendt tracked the rabbit, not to a serpent's hole, but to Heidegger's burrow. The fox is fabled in various ways, all of which are negative: Most often, he is trapped, in danger, or in want, and restores himself to comfort by entrapping others. When others set about to betray or entrap the fox, and he escapes without so much as a scratch, there is the sense that this is only because he recognised something fox-like in others, and not because there is something of good in him.³² However, "Heidegger the Fox" is unique:

No one would go into his trap, because he was sitting inside it himself.

This annoyed him. [...] And so it occurred to our fox to decorate his trap beautifully and to hang up unequivocal signs everywhere on it that quite clearly said: 'Come here, everyone; this is a trap, the most beautiful trap in the world.' From this point on it was clear that no fox could stray into this trap by mistake. Nevertheless, many came. For this trap was our fox's burrow, and if you wanted to visit him where he was at home, you had to step into his trap. [...] But the fox who lived in the trap said proudly: 'So many are visiting me in my trap that I have become the best of all foxes.' And there is some truth in that, too: Nobody knows the nature of traps better than one who sits in a trap his whole life long.³³

Arendt did not focus on “rehabilitating [Heidegger]” as a philosopher and his writings, a philosophy, either to her esteem, or to that of “a skeptical public.”³⁴ Neither did Arendt focus on debilitating Heidegger. Arendt deliberately set the “facts” aside, and wrote a fable, in which the fox is one for whom the concepts of burrow and trap are collapsed. Heidegger the fox is neither naïve nor cunning in inviting other foxes into his burrow-trap—only hospitable. He is “annoyed” when other foxes refuse to enter it, “*because* he [is] sitting inside it himself,” because it is good enough for him. He entreats all of the other foxes, “Come here, everyone; this is a trap, the most beautiful trap in the world.” Some of the foxes agree with him; others disagree; but they all search the trap for rabbits. Perhaps Arendt focussed, not on Heidegger’s entreaty to critics, but on critics’ responding to it as such. Perhaps what Arendt considered as being unethical are the ways in which critics judge what is and is not philosophy and by which they hurry to their own entrapment. It is common to suggest that critics have “political responsibility as intellectuals.” But critics—looking for either something like a burrow or something like a trap; accepting either Heidegger’s invitation to ignore his misdeeds or the job of “discerning and naming evil and acting conformably with that understanding”—hurry to their entrapment instead of to social equality.³⁵ Go by “either you like,” at the same hazard: Both of upholding good politics and rejecting the bad, and ignoring bad politics and claiming to uphold the good, are irresponsible, because they set politics against philosophy and against whatever social equality might come about by philosophy.³⁶

In their readings, Farias shows too little faith in man; Argyros and Farwell “manifest [...] a degree of faith, an identification with [Heidegger’s] thought, that no counter-evidence would be expected to shake”; and all of them show the fox’s weakness of character in so doing.³⁷ David Wood put it another way: The “clarifying and codifying [of] the scope and significance of [ethical] terms” is a necessary evil: it sets “the calculation of our responsibility” against “the ethical as [...] an openness to the incalculable.” But when critics designate ethical terms too rigidly, these “take the form of snares and delusions.”³⁸ Farias, Argyros, and Farwell all read “prudently,” that is, they all oversimplify the issue of the relationship between Heidegger’s politics and his philosophy, in the narrow interests of their respective academic burrow-traps.

Alice could see, as well as if she were looking over their shoulders, that all the jurors were writing down ‘Stupid things!’ on their slates, and she could even make out that one of them didn’t know how to spell ‘stupid,’ and that he had to ask his neighbour to tell him. ‘A nice muddle their slates’ll be in, before the trial’s over!’ thought Alice.³⁹

It is terribly easy to subscribe to an economics sans ethics. It is terribly easy to be a critic of the sort that labels “good” and “evil” as if for all intents and purposes, for once and all. But critics have the responsibility to move around in those categories, to think ethically. Critics have the responsibility to “step out of [the trap]” of good etiquette.⁴⁰ For outside that trap, “[t]here’s *plenty* of room” to think ethically, to set what people need against what this or that group of people wants.⁴¹

So critics ought not to blindly follow other critics. But ought critics to follow Heidegger? Wood suggested that the phrase “thinking ‘after’ Heidegger” has a number of meanings:

“Thinking ‘after’ could be understood along the lines of ‘running after’ or ‘looking after.’ Or consider what we mean when we say a boy takes *after* his father [...] To these senses we can add the sense of taking up where Heidegger left off, or in a way that responds to Heidegger’s interventions, or one that tries to avoid his terrible political errors.”

Some of these meanings contradict one another. The thing to do is not to fix on any one of them at the expense of the others. The thing to do is to stop dividing philosophy and the criticism of philosophy from one another so exactly. Wood wrote, “We are [...] unclear about [...] what it is to follow in the footsteps of other philosophers.” It needs to be made clear that philosophical criticism does not entail “following” philosophy in the sense of simply agreeing or disagreeing with it. Philosophical criticism entails an “ethical reading,” “a way of understanding reading in fundamentally ethical terms,” “a way of thinking responsibility and ‘ethics’ in a manner that subjects the scope of the ethical to repeated displacement,” in other words, repeated philosophising.⁴² When that is clear—when critics of philosophy and philosophers stop competing with one another and start conversing with one another—then it is ethical to read Heidegger, because it is possible to read Heidegger ethically. It is all a matter of foxes, not wearing sheep’s clothing, but admitting what they are and working

from there. Responses to “Why on earth do you want to read Heidegger” might now include “I want to read Heidegger because I want to challenge myself.”

John McCumber, in his *Metaphysics and Oppression*, performed what might be called an ethical reading and writing of Heidegger. McCumber reviewed the usual reading strategies: The first is to “take one of the two characteristics as basic, reducing the other to mere appearance, even delusion.” For example, Farias argued that Heidegger’s anti-Semitism undermines his greatness as a thinker. The second is to take Heidegger’s philosophy separately from his politics, which Joseph J. Kockelmans viewed as an unfortunate accident, or “*Schein*.” McCumber found both of the usual reading and writing strategies to be inadequate, to be prudent instead of diligent. “That a Nazi can be a great philosopher”—that Heidegger can be a Nazi and a great philosopher—“is no trivial possibility.” McCumber reviewed Jürgen Habermas’ strategy, which is to map the change in Heidegger, over time, from philosophy to an apology for Nazism. McCumber considered Habermas’ strategy as being “immediately untenable.” For it assumes that Heidegger was a philosopher or a Nazi, or, more closely, that Heidegger was a philosopher and became a Nazi. McCumber viewed Heidegger’s “early” and “later” work as a whole, in the sense that it is wholly capable of philosophising and of propagandising. Finally, McCumber reviewed Jean-François Lyotard’s strategy, which is to admit Heidegger’s importance as a philosopher; to recognise that his involvement with the Nazis was ““deliberate, profound, and [...] persistent””; and to concede that neither of these can be downplayed, or left in “mutual indifference.” Lyotard’s strategy acknowledges every brain’s fallibility

and the potential for “slippage” between politics and philosophy, between Heidegger and his writings, and between pieces of writing, by replacing the word “author” with “text,” or “Heidegger” with, just for example, “The Question Concerning Technology.” Lyotard’s strategy is, “instead of seeking and criticizing the shaping force of a single authorial personality over the development of an entire *oeuvre*, [...] trac[ing] the welter of complexities and incapacities which, in various texts, constitute the unstable ‘interface’ between Heideggerian thinking and Nazism.” McCumber adopted Lyotard’s strategy in *Metaphysics and Oppression*, not because it is easy to use, or the one way to access Heidegger’s writings, or the one way to access writings, period, but because it is a strategy that puts every brain to the task of philosophy.⁴³

Critics are free to take Heidegger, not at his vow, but word by word, in every piece of his writing. Heidegger’s intentions are moot, but his texts “do [conform to] standards, and [...] can be criticized.” Heidegger’s writing does not “supplant but incorporates and presupposes a correspondence theory of truth,” does not “precede all argumentation or dispense with it but presupposes and uses it.”⁴⁴ Some critics have disdained Heidegger’s use of language as obfuscatory. But Heidegger is “one of ‘the few and the rare’ who set a standard by which,” not only he, but also “those who disagree with him may be judged.” Because Heidegger manages between “the manner in which we philosophize and the ‘content’ or import of philosophy,” they must manage. Heidegger’s approach—his particular use of language—is not the point: Critics are free to devise their own approaches, and “that [Heidegger’s approach] flirts with the risk of failure is

no objection if to carry on with business as usual would have guaranteed failure.”⁴⁵

Thomas Sheehan wrote, “We know now how greatly [Heidegger] ‘erred.’ The question remains about how greatly he thought. The way to answer that question is not to stop reading Heidegger but to start demythologizing him.”⁴⁶ Philosophy is not perfect, but, like the best philosophical criticism, it believes in perfectibility. “The text of a thinker is only worth studying if reading it makes a significant difference in how we see the world and ourselves.”⁴⁷ Heidegger might be worth reading as philosophy because to do so makes a significant positive or negative change in every brain’s world view. Heidegger might be worth reading as philosophy because to do so precisely does not confer mythological status on him. For “every thinker remains constantly in dialogue with those who have gone before and, perhaps more so and in a yet more hidden way, with those who will come after.”⁴⁸ Heidegger’s writings are never finally philosophy or propaganda but always reinterpretable, in known and as yet unknown ways, toward any number of possibilities.

2.0 Heidegger and English Studies

2.1 How Does English Studies Read Heidegger?

What have Heidegger’s writings got to do with English Studies? William Spanos noted, “Heidegger’s presence is now coming to be felt, however tentatively, by some [...] scholars professing the other humanities, especially literary studies.”⁴⁹ However, this has little to do with Heidegger’s writings. English Studies tend to meet, not Heidegger’s writings, but Derrida’s and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s reading and writing of Heidegger. In other words, English Studies tend to meet,

not Heidegger's philosophy, but "Heidegger's discourse [turned] against itself," Heidegger's discourse made relevant to English Studies' present concerns.⁵⁰ Lacoue-Labarthe considered Heidegger as being readable—as philosophic, or poetic, or artistic—and accepted Heidegger's theses about philosophy on that basis. But for Lacoue-Labarthe, there is no relationship between Heidegger's personal politics and his philosophy because Heidegger's "delimitation and deconstruction of philosophy do not constitute a philosophy."⁵¹ Lacoue-Labarthe might have done well to note that there is room in philosophy, as "the study of the truths and principles of being, knowledge, or conduct," for its own delimitation and deconstruction.⁵² Lacoue-Labarthe's reading of Heidegger might seem—in contrast with Farias' *Heidegger and Nazism*—open-minded. But it has nothing to do with philosophy, in the sense of having nothing to do with questioning biases, and nothing to do with literary criticism, in the sense of leaving it unprovoked. In other words, Lacoue-Labarthe's reading of Heidegger operates on the assumption that all writings—philosophic, or artistic, or whatever—are simply objects, about which critics may call on just enough facts to compose a kind of fiction in which the aim is, not to provoke commonly held opinions, but quite simply to reinforce them. When English Studies mimics that reading of Heidegger, they serve only "to judge"—as in, decide—that writing makes a "compromise."⁵³

Joseph N. Riddel suggested that, although literary critics do well to study Heidegger's writings, they embrace Derrida's and Lacoue-Labarthe's literary criticism at a hazard. Riddell gestured to Heidegger's statement that "Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have understood

what is to be interpreted.””⁵⁴ In other words, the practices of reading and writing and interpretation are the same. Any reading and writing that is to contribute understanding must already have understood, not simply the book, but also some practice of interpretation. What is to be interpreted is, not simply the book, but the book in relation to some commonly held truth or set of truths. Mark Okrent called philosophical interpretation a “paradigmatically human activity.” Derrida’s and Lacoue-Labarthe’s literary criticism would oppose positivist models of knowledge. But, at the same time, they would not call literary criticism the dilettante practice of reading and writing according to the interests of individuals. Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, and the others—although they will disagree here and there and often vociferously—still view themselves as being part of a community of literary critics. Literary criticism is not an alternative to positivist models of knowledge but more closely approximates an alternative among them. For literary criticism, like positivist models of knowledge, “involves a double teleology,” in which a person reads and writes, not simply as an end in itself, but to prove—to him- or herself, to the world—that he or she is “a certain sort of person,” a good person, a moral person...a literary critic.⁵⁵ A person aims by reading and writing to pursue the “right” version of truth, above any number of “wrong” ones, and, in the process, to prove—to him- or herself, to other academics—that he or she is the best literary critic. In other words: That there is purportedly no longer any truth is a claim that flatly refutes itself. And the truth is that the general category of “human activity” subsumes, not only philosophy, but also literary criticism. There is such a thing as having too much in common, and “philosophical literary

criticism”—in which interpretations, or “deceptions,” gain credence “simply by intersecting with [philosophy’s] avowed aim to speak the truth”—is that thing.⁵⁶

Perhaps it is a fact that Tweedledum and Tweedledee

are what geometers call ‘enantiomorphs,’ mirror-image forms of each other [...] This is strongly suggested by Tweedledee’s favorite word, ‘contrariwise,’ and by [their] extend[ing] right and left hands for a handshake. [In the] picture of the two enantiomorphs [they are] arrayed for battle, standing in identical postures.⁵⁷

All that is clear is that foxes abound, in philosophic and literary criticism alike.

The thing is not for the literary foxes to masquerade as the philosophic ones; a fox is a fox is a fox. The thing is for all of the foxes to admit that they are foxes and work at reading and writing more philosophically, or more literarily, or more openly.

2.2 How might English Studies read Heidegger?

It is worthwhile considering that philosophy and fiction, although they are not one and the same, are alike in one respect: Neither of them speaks, or speaks against, the truth. Robert W. Jordan called it “the prevalent but mistaken interpretation [...] that, since Heidegger says that presuppositions are part of the essential structure of explication, all interpretation is essentially relative to the presuppositions of the interpreter and, aside from their own preconditions, to those presuppositions alone.” In Jordan’s reading and writing of Heidegger, the literary critic and the critic of philosophy share the same task of interpreting writings—philosophic or artistic—not simply from within or from without his

presuppositions, but from within his presuppositions “in the correct way.”⁵⁸ David Farrell Krell found that the correct way to read and write is to be self-effacing, not in the sense of erasing himself and his interests from his reading and writing of Heidegger, but in the sense of respecting the ability of Heidegger’s writings to say in different ways, at different times, to different audiences. Krell cautioned, “[E]ditors’ arguments are often best ignored [...] Heidegger himself emphasised that the issues to which [his] essays respond are what is important. He discouraged biography or doxographical fixations on ‘Martin Heidegger’ and encouraged questioning.”⁵⁹ Whatever an editor’s, or an author’s, set of beliefs and intentions, writings—Heidegger’s, artistic, philosophic—function to open up, and never to close, discussion.

The question remains “What have Heidegger’s writings got to do with English Studies?” Heidegger’s writings—whether they are philosophy, in the sense of the best philosophical criticism, or literary criticism, in a similar sense—have nothing *to do* with English Studies, that is, they are not lessons put to English Studies. But Heidegger’s writings do force English Studies to study itself.

‘Oh, Kitty, how nice it would be if we could get through into Looking-Glass House! I’m sure it’s got, oh! such beautiful things in it! Let’s pretend there’s a way of getting through into it, somehow, Kitty. Let’s pretend the glass has got all soft like gauze, so that we can get through. Why, it’s turning into a sort of mist now, I declare! It’ll be easy enough to get through—’[...] And certainly the glass *was* beginning to melt way, just like a bright silver mist.⁶⁰

It is possible for critics to share the task of reading and writing without sharing too much, in other words, to share the task of reading and writing without razing the categories of professor and student, fiction and philosophy, and the disciplines of literary and philosophical criticism. It is possible for literary critics to subject their thinking to fiction, to philosophy, to the humanities in a way that has special relevance for English Studies, and that makes English Studies relevant to the humanities and the university in which it finds itself.

3.0 The University

3.1 The First universities

The possibility of studies that are joined and distinctive in fundamental ways is not new: The early thirteenth century witnessed what may be called attempts to describe it. The first universities of Bologna, Naples, Toulouse, Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge were “established [...] as guilds or corporations devoted to study and as places where masters and scholars could come together.” Two different models attempted to bring masters and scholars together. According to “*civitas*,” the university was an “important mediaeval association,” which was “bound by rules, rather than common undertakings, by civic decencies rather than moral precepts.” According to “*universitas*,” the university was “a corporate enterprise with an identified common purpose.” In about 1809, England witnessed “a lively debate,” in which *universitas* and *civitas* “compete[d] as [...] modes of understanding.”

Those who participated in the debate considered

the relative merits of the ancient and modern curriculum, the one centred on Classical studies of history, philosophy and rhetoric, the other on modern literature, languages and history; arguments for the transcendent

value of learning [and arguments for] learning as preparation for the world; and the relationship between religion and secular learning.

Cardinal John Newman and Matthew Arnold played major roles in the debate. Each of them “defended a liberal education” as “distinct from preparation for a practical life.” But whereas Newman based liberal education on the civic model, Arnold based it on *universitas*. Newman “sought to make the entire world the student’s university and saw liberal education not as a moral enterprise, but as the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.” This sounds to offer every brain an equal opportunity to pursue knowledge and transcendence. In contrast, Arnold “appealed to the study of the ‘great tradition’ of ‘the best which has been thought and said in the world.’” This sounds to be a less than liberal education, limiting the pursuit of knowledge to the pursuit of what has already been thought and said in the world. However, Newman’s university was “a ‘place of teaching,’” whose pedagogical aim was, not to “advanc[e] discovery,” but to “diffus[e] and extend [...] what was known, with the benefit of creating understanding and tolerance for a world that could not be remade.” On the other hand, Arnold’s university was a place of learning, whose aim was, not to diffuse perfect knowledge, but to advance it, to work at perfecting it.⁶¹ This thesis claims neither that Newman’s university utterly failed to describe the possibility of studies that are fundamentally joined and distinctive nor that Arnold’s university succeeded in describing that possibility. But this thesis does view Arnold’s university as a good starting point.

3.2 Matthew Arnold: What is the role of popular education?

Arnold—having “inherited” his father’s understanding of the importance of education to the masses—developed that understanding into a full-fledged “passion for education, the passion of a life-time.” Arnold started out his career—what sounds to be noble—intending to be the “guide, philosopher and friend of the teacher.” But, in 1862, Robert Lowe’s “Revised Code” altered the course of Arnold’s career. Arnold became H.M. Inspector of Schools in 1851, holding this post until 1886. His job description—along the lines of “the examiner of children in the three R’s at an annual judgment day”—sounds to be dull. But, in spite of the “tedium and drudgery,” Arnold found himself in a position to learn. His “work [...] acquainted [him] with every class of society,” especially with the working- and lower-middle classes, at a time when England was concerned with education, especially as regards the poor.⁶²

Arnold looked beyond England’s geographical and conceptual bounds. He discovered that, whereas in England “scholar” designated someone who was entitled to knowledge because of his wealth, in other countries the word designated someone who was entitled to knowledge regardless of his economic class. For example, in Switzerland, Arnold “had occasion to touch upon the primary school,—the school of the poor,—because there this school form[ed] a link in the chain of schools in which the middle and upper classes are educated.” In other words, “all classes” of Swiss, rich and poor, “use[d] the same primary school.” Every scholar—regardless of his economic class—received the same primary education as every other scholar. Similarly, in France, every child was a

scholar, attending “either [...] a public school under a certificated teacher, or [...] a private school under a certificated teacher.” Although private schools were liable only to partial State-inspection, a huge majority of scholars attended “public, completely inspected schools.” And in Prussia, every child was a scholar, being “subjected from his sixth year to his fifteenth to obligatory instruction, either in public schools under certificated teachers who [had] had a three years’ training in a normal school, or in private schools under teachers who [had] produce[d] the same, or higher, guarantees of competency.” In Prussia, to be a scholar was, not a child’s privilege, but his responsibility. In all of Switzerland, France, and Prussia, class marked an economic deprivation, not necessarily an educational one.⁶³

As Arnold compared foreign schools systems and the English schools system, he disagreed with the claim that the latter system would flourish under the Revised Code, which Lowe wrote and the Committee of Council on Education promulgated. Arnold wrote,

[i]n England, [...] out of some two millions and a quarter of children whom our Education Commissioners count as scholars, there are only 920, 000 in schools with certificated teachers, or under any public inspection, complete or incomplete, whatever; all the rest are in schools which give no tangible guarantees of any kind, which do not, therefore, in a foreigner’s eyes, possess any real claim to style themselves schools, and their pupils scholars, at all.⁶⁴

Yet, according to the Revised Code, all students were responsible, not only for reading the newspaper and Bible “*without conscious difficulty*,” but also for reading them “*in an intelligent manner*.”⁶⁵ In Arnold’s judgement, the English schools system, far from “compar[ing] favourably” with other systems, would eventually fail to compare with them at all.⁶⁶ For the Revised Code did not revise the old system of funding in such a way as to enable poor students to fulfill their responsibility: The old system of funding had disbursed more funds to English schools for the rich and less to those for the poor. Under the Revised Code, funds were to be disbursed to English schools regardless of economic standing. But this did not mean that funds were to be disbursed to English schools according to their relative financial need, or even in equal amounts. Instead, funds were to be disbursed to schools according to past success or failure, regardless of differences in economic standing and previous funding. In other words, the Revised Code, not having considered the basis of the old system of funding as problematic, would “actually [...] reduce considerably the grants at present contributed by the State towards the support of schools for the poor.”⁶⁷ The Revised Code would, instead of providing England with “sound and cheap elementary instruction” all around, provide, more systematically than ever, that the upper- received instruction at the moral expense of the lower-classes.⁶⁸ Worse than poverty is the belief that it is a deserved and an unchangeable fact of one’s life.

According to Arnold, his critics charged “that it is very easy to sit in one’s study and find fault with the course of modern society, but the thing is to propose practical improvements for it.”⁶⁹ Arnold put it to those critics that it was very

easy—and quite comfortable—for them to sit in the unstudied belief that there is nothing to be done about the course of modern society: “Those who have grown up amidst a certain state of things, those whose habits, and interests, and affections, are closely concerned with its continuance, are slow to believe that it is not a part of the order of nature, or that it can ever come to an end.”⁷⁰ Arnold answered to various negative criticisms— which generally charged him “with living out of the world and knowing nothing of life and men”—less to prove his intellect, and more to improve the world for men. In Arnold’s view,

Faith in machinery is [...] our besetting danger; often in machinery most absurdly disproportioned to the end which this machinery, if it is to do any good at all, is to serve; but always in machinery, as if it had a value in and for itself. What is freedom but machinery? what is population but machinery? what is coal but machinery? what are railroads but machinery? what is wealth but machinery? what are, even, religious organisations but machinery? Now almost every voice in England is accustomed to think of these things as if they were precious ends in themselves, and therefore had some of the characters of perfection indisputably joined to them.

The above passage charges men with living in the world and knowing nothing of the way in which they do so. In other words, men live amidst machinery as though it is natural. It is difficult for men to view machinery as such because they view the world through it: Machinery is not only “wealth,” but also “freedom”; not only “religious organizations,” but also religion; not only industry, but also industriousness; not only metal, but also mental. It is easy for men to see

“perfection” in objects; it is easy for men to have “faith” in objects, “as if [these are] precious ends in themselves”; and it is hard for men to “disput[e],” because there is no freedom from concepts such as “perfection” and “faith.” But blind faith in machinery is dangerous, because machinery—whether or not “it is to do any good”—can do, or be left to do, bad. In Arnold’s view, charges of simple fault-finding and acquiescing to the present state of affairs all indulge in “the worship of the mere freedom to do as one likes,” “the worship of machinery,” the worship of something false. He neither accepted “that things are for the most part to be settled first and understood afterwards” nor championed dissent for its own sake. Instead, Arnold challenged England to disturb its present system of thought in order to *improve* it.⁷¹

3.3 Matthew Arnold: What is the liberal university?

Arnold set about to disturb England’s basic understanding of “culture,” according to which it was an inherited thing, consisting mainly in French and Latin. French was “a taught language and the medium of instruction” in the primary schools, and Latin was the “automatic language of scholarship” in the universities.

“Classical Latin” “derive[d] prestige from the great writers who used it, and [...] enjoy[ed] the air of regulation and fixity conferred upon it by the scholars who codified it in grammars.”⁷² But in Arnold’s view, when it comes to “the goodness of a poor child’s reading [,] absolute standards are [...] out of place.”⁷³ Arnold viewed ““a smattering of” French and “the two dead languages of Latin and Greek”” as no inheritance, and certainly no valid requirement. An education based in *civitas* viewed as natural and respectable the division between classes, and only

served to accustom students to it. An education based in *civitas* allowed students to pursue that knowledge in which they had an interest. And the study of Latin was “begotten by nothing so intellectual as curiosity [and] valued either out of sheer vanity and ignorance, or else as an engine of social and class distinction, separating its holder, like a badge or title, from other people who ha[d] not got it.”⁷⁴

Arnold viewed as “natural and respectable” the “desire of the lower classes to raise themselves.”⁷⁵ In his view, it was necessary to base liberal education, not in *civitas*, but in *universitas*, in “a corporate enterprise with an identified common purpose.”⁷⁶ For the voluntary study of Latin by some and English by others frustrated the desire of the lower classes to raise themselves, whereas the enforced study of English by all gave expression to it. English had been developing—albeit slowly—“in the shadow” and “under the influence of” Latin. It was English that, by bringing “feelings of group loyalty,” had already proved itself to be the inheritance of all classes.

English became [...] a *promoted* language, a mark of ‘Englishness’ [...]

Alliances were made between lesser landowners [...] and the rising merchant class in the towns, a pact institutionalised in the thirteenth century by the assembly that came to be called Parliament. The founding of universities stimulated mobility, both geographical and social, among certain sections of the population; and by the fourteenth century mobility had even spread to the land-labourers, who could bargain for wages now that labour was scarce. By that time, the balance of forces was beginning

to favour an increasingly articulate, English-speaking merchant class. It was this class, with London as its base, that spoke the basis of what came to be called standard English.⁷⁷

Arnold might have agreed that English was, not a superior language, but one that a range of people promoted, and that promoted unity among that range of people. In other words, Arnold might have agreed that English was not useful in itself but in context, as the vernacular.

An education based in the civic model—an education that took as its governing principle, “the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake”—did not put the same education and the same ticket within reach of all students. On the principle “The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake,” rich students continued to take degrees in Latin and their places in the upper class, and poor students took degrees in the vernacular and resumed life in the lower classes. Arnold “defended a liberal education distinct from preparation for a practical life.”⁷⁸ In other words: Arnold defended a liberal education that offered the same degree in the vernacular to all students. Arnold challenged, “[E]veryone knows”—for evidently everyone did not know, as in understand—“that children brought up with raw and illiterate parents are more stubborn material as scholars, than children brought up in more civilised homes.”⁷⁹ In his view, learning did not demand special talent, but entailed the development of a latent talent. He believed that England saw children of the lower classes ““eaten up with disease, half-sized, half-fed, half-clothed, neglected by their parents, without health, without home, without hope”” more originally due to a shortage of education than of funds.⁸⁰ Arnold insisted that the

English schools system enable the lower classes—who were “no longer so ready” to “recognise [the] superiority [...] of the upper class over all others”—to obtain a satisfactory primary education.⁸¹ A sturdy primary education would prepare poor students for a university degree that they would not otherwise have had the practical means to obtain.

Arnold insisted that the university, not prepare poor students for a practical life, but subject them to a thinking life that they might not otherwise have pursued. Arnold specifically referred to the reading of “the best that is known and thought in the world,” which was, in his estimation, “Christian Knowledge.” But remember that he called religious organisations machinery. Arnold viewed Christian knowledge and religious organisations as imperfect. Arnold did not reconceive culture as being a discursive domain in which “the really blessed thing is to like what right reason ordains, and to follow her authority,” because he valued Christian knowledge and religious organisations for their own sake.⁸² In *Literature and Dogma*, he wrote,

There is no surer proof of a narrow and ill-instructed mind than to think and uphold that what a man takes to be the truth on religious matters is always to be proclaimed. Our truth on these matters, and likewise the error of others, is something so relative that the good or harm likely to be done by speaking ought always to be taken into account [...] If the present time is a time to speak, there must be a reason why it is so.

Arnold considered his time as being a time to speak. The reason was “the spread of skepticism,” in which the classes were “rejecting the Bible.” Arnold was

precisely *not* a “man who believe[d] that his truth on religious matters is so absolutely the truth, that say it when, and where, and to whom he will, he cannot but do good with it.”⁸³ Arnold valued right reason above all, and Christian knowledge and religious organisations as leading, not to right reason, but toward it.

In calling “the Bible and its religion” “*all*-important,” he “spoke practically.” The Bible had long been the truth for a majority of England, and continued to be the truth for “the very large part of human life,” so that “rejecting it altogether” or as “an exploded superstition” entailed inestimable consequences for every system of life, specifically, the educational.⁸⁴ “The papacy [had directly] supported [...] many of the first universities.”⁸⁵ In Arnold’s view, “the Bible cannot possibly die” because of the implications for education.⁸⁶ Speaking practically, it was not enough for students to study English. To study English within a “secular education”—to study English within the civic model—would be, instead of to render upper- and lower-class students equals in the university, to abandon right reason and authority, at a hazard.⁸⁷ Arnold likened the proposal to adopt secular education to “that [...] of the fox, who had lost his own tail, to put all the other foxes in the same case by a general cutting off of tails.”⁸⁸ Arnold referred to the following fable:

A fox who had lost his tail in a trap was so ashamed of the disfigurement that he felt life was not worth living. So he decided to persuade all the other foxes to maim themselves in the same way; then, he thought, his own loss would not be so conspicuous. He collected them all and advised

them to cut off their tails. A tail, he said, was merely a superfluous appendage, ugly to look at and heavy to carry. But one of the others answered: 'Look here!' You only give us this advice because it suits your own book.'

This tale satirizes those who offer advice to their neighbours not out of benevolence but from self-interest.⁸⁹

In Arnold's view, "the right course here [is] not [to] cut off tails all round, but rather that the other foxes should keep their tails, and that the fox without a tail should get one."⁹⁰ In the civic model, freedom is illusory: Without limits on rights—without a responsibility to one another—no one can be free. In other words: To adopt secular education would seem to "level the playing field" in the first instance. Subsequently, simply doing as one liked would reinscribe the division between classes. Arnold's model of liberal education, by insisting on religion, delimited freedom, made freedom possible.

Although Arnold professed his belief in a nationally established religion, he did not "try to indoctrinate the masses with the set of ideas and judgments constituting the creed of [his] own profession or party."⁹¹ He knew that "the churches cannot even conceive of the Bible without the gloss they at present put upon it, and this gloss [...] cannot possibly live." Instead of "fiercely battling as to whether the Church should be a national institution or no," and whether this or that sect ought to be a national institution or no, Arnold set about to "recast religion." In his view, "if this [were] done"—if he recast religion as, not an institution that reinforces views, but an institution that compels their re-

evaluation—"the new religion [would] be the national one," and would bring the classes together, at least concerning education. And "if it [were] not done"—if men separated "the nation, in its collective and corporate character, from religion" instead—the result would be the reification of the division between classes.⁹²

Arnold was, "above all, a believer in culture." He distinguished between "*hole-and-corner* forms of religion," which "inevitably favour provincialism," and "a national establishment of religion," which, by conscious choice, "favours totality." Arnold advanced a view of culture in which it, by "plac[ing] human perfection in an *internal* condition," is possibly

the great help out of our present difficulties; culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world; and through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we now follow staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is a virtue in following them staunchly which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically.

Moreover, culture "is a harmonious expansion of *all* the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not consistent with the over-development of any one power at the expense of the rest. Here culture goes beyond religion, as religion is generally conceived by us."⁹³

In Arnold's view,

Our mechanical and materialising theology, with its insane license of affirmation about God, its insane license of affirmation about a future state, is really the result of the poverty of our minds. It is because we cannot trace God in history that we stay the craving of our minds with a fancy-account of him, made up by putting scattered expressions of the Bible together, and taking them literally; it is because we have such a scanty sense of the life of humanity, that we proceed in the like manner in our scheme of a future state.⁹⁴

Arnold supposed that augmenting the English schools system to enable the lower classes to obtain an education “would really augment their self-respect and moral force; it would truly fuse them with the class above, and tend to bring about for them the equality which they are entitled to desire.”⁹⁵ Arnold could have said “fuse the classes together” to suggest classlessness, but instead he said “fuse them with the class above,” suggesting that social levelling is an upward one. But elsewhere Arnold does suggest classlessness. He disagrees with the State’s indoctrinating citizens, and also that

the aim and office of instruction [...] is to make a man a good citizen, or a good Christian, or a gentleman; or [that] it is to fit him to get on in the world; or [that] it is to enable him to do his duty in that state of life to which he is called. It is none of these, and the modern spirit more and more discerns it to be none of these. These are at best secondary and indirect aims of instruction; its prime direct aim is to enable a man *to know*

himself and the world. Such knowledge is the only sure basis for action, and this basis it is the true aim and office of instruction to supply.⁹⁶

Arnold was not too solicitous, too willing to relinquish his comfort. But in his view, culture “does not try to teach down to the level of inferior classes; it does not try to win them for this or that sect of its own, with ready-made judgments and watchwords. It seeks to do away with classes [,] to make all men live in an atmosphere of sweetness and light, where they may use ideas, as it uses them itself, freely,—nourished, and not bound by them.” Culture does not aim to reinscribe upper-class taste as ““a true and satisfying ideal of human perfection,”” to reinscribe provincialism. Neither does the “English ideal” “that every one should be free to do and to look just as he likes” obtain, for although “the mere endeavour to see and learn the truth for our own personal satisfaction is indeed a commencement for making it prevail,” the point of culture is not, after all, personal satisfaction. Arnold held his and everyone’s ordinary interests, “in comparison with th[e] wider endeavour of [...] plain and great utility,” as being always “selfish, petty, and unprofitable.” Culture is “not merely the endeavour to *see* and *learn* this, but [...] the endeavour also to make it *prevail*.” Culture might indirectly enable a class to reject “any centre of taste and authority” that would subordinate its needs to those of another class.⁹⁷

Arnold posited a kind of innatism: “Every man is born with aptitudes which give him access to vital and formative knowledge.”⁹⁸ As he understood it, these aptitudes fitted every man for one of two motives of study. ““The first motive which ought to impel us to study,” as Montesquieu put it, ““is the desire to

augment the excellence of our nature, and to render an intelligent being yet more intelligent.”” In other words, in Arnold’s view, human beings are born intelligent and inclined to study; although they may choose to study in a self-serving way, it is more worthwhile to study in a way that serves their intelligence. Arnold called the first motive to study “the true ground to assign for the genuine scientific passion, however manifested, and for culture, viewed simply as a fruit of this passion; and it is a worthy ground.” But there is another—and, in Arnold’s view, “pre-eminent”—motive to study, which always calls for and sometimes builds on “the [...] desire to see things as they are, natural and proper in an intelligent being.” That motive is “the love of our neighbour, the impulses towards action, help, and beneficence, the desire for removing human error, clearing human confusion, and diminishing human misery, the noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we found it.”⁹⁹ In Arnold’s view,

Every man is born with aptitudes which give him access to vital and formative knowledge by one of these roads; either by the road of studying man and his works, or by the road of studying nature and her works. The business of instruction is to seize and develop [sic] these aptitudes. The great and complete spirits which have all the aptitudes for both roads of knowledge are rare. But much more might be done on both roads by the same mind, if instruction clearly grasped the idea of the entire system of aptitudes for which it has to provide; of their correlation, and of their *equipollency*, so to speak, as all leading, if rightly employed, to vital knowledge; and if then, having grasped this idea, it provided for them.¹⁰⁰

When Arnold wrote about “the entire system of aptitudes,” perhaps he indulged in clarification and calculation. But Arnold’s culture does not cater to but cultivates a variety of aptitudes in relation to one another. Men—all men—must never rest comfortably in their own opinions. Instead, they must work freely at developing their “inward thinking,” by which they will “draw ever nearer to a sense of what is indeed beautiful, graceful, and becoming,” and of each other, “and [...] get [...] to like that.” Arnold imagined an England in which there were natures “with a curiosity about their best self, with a bent for seeing things as they are, for disentangling themselves from machinery, for simply concerning themselves with [...] the pursuit of perfection.”¹⁰¹

Arnold imagined an England in which natures—not perfect, but inclined toward perfection—engaged in reading. He wrote, “One must, I think, be struck more and more, the longer one lives, to find out how much, in our present society, a man’s life of each day depends for its solidity and value on whether he reads during that day, and, far more still, on what he reads during it.”¹⁰² But what, exactly, did Arnold mean by “what”? Arnold noted, “The religious world [...] seems to be against mere letters, which they slight as the vague and inexact instrument of shallow essayists and magazine-writers; and in favour of dogma, of a scientific and exact presentment of religious things, instead of a literary presentment of them.” Arnold was against dogma, against “misunderstanding” the terms “*grace, new birth, justification*,” and “*God*” “in a fixed and rigid manner, as if they were symbols with as definite and fully grasped a meaning as the names *line or angle*.” Arnold was in favour of a literary presentment of religious things.

He understood grace, new birth, justification, and God as being terms “of poetry and eloquence,” “*literary* term[s],” terms “*thrown out*, so to speak, at [...] not fully grasped object[s] of the speaker’s consciousness.” Arnold understood that what men meant by those terms was as “different [...] as their consciousness differs.” So it was inappropriate to read religion as factual.

A system of theological notions about personality, essence, existence, consubstantiality, is *artificial* religion, and is the proper opposite to *revealed*; since it is a religion which comes forth in no one’s consciousness, but is invented by theologians,—able men with uncommon talent for abstruse reasoning. This religion is in no sense revealed, just because it is in no sense natural.

Likewise, “the language of the Bible is fluid, passing, and literary, not rigid, fixed, and scientific.” In Arnold’s view, the Bible was the exemplar for fiction. As such, it was inappropriate to read the Bible in scientific terms: “The language of science [...] will be *below* what we feel to be the truth. It was appropriate, not to read “to determine what we ought to do,” but to read in a way that “make[s] us do [what we ought to do].” Arnold suggested, “If we read but a very little, we naturally want to press it all; if we read a great deal, we are willing not to press the whole of what we read, and we learn what ought to be pressed and what not. Now this is really the very foundation of any sane criticism.” By “what we read,” Arnold might have meant “a great deal,” with the proviso to “be content not to use a great deal of [it],” that is, to be content, not to use it to support opinions, beliefs,

arguments, but to use it in the correct way. Without that proviso, “no part of our time is more idly spent than the time spent in reading.”¹⁰³

What of “what we ought to do”? In Arnold’s view, the correct way to read—the Bible, fiction, whatever—is ethically. Arnold suggested that the antithesis between *ethical* and *religious* is quite a false one. Ethical means *practical*, it relates to practice or conduct passing into habit or disposition. Religious also means *practical*, but in a still higher degree; and the right antithesis to both ethical and religious, is the same as the right antithesis to practical: namely, *theoretical* [...] Religious is the ethical imbued with feeling. It is “the very great part in righteousness which belongs, we may say, to *not ourselves*. In the first place, we did not make ourselves and our nature, or conduct as the object of three-fourths of that nature; we did not provide that happiness should follow conduct, as it undeniably does [...] and, in the next place, our dealing with it at all [...] is not wholly, or even nearly wholly, in our own power [...] So much is there incalculable.”¹⁰⁴

When the ethical and the religious are both understood as relating to practice—when the religious is understood as disposed to practice and the ethical, as practice passing into disposition—it is possible to read the Bible, fiction, everything in a useful way. There is the sense that, when Arnold wrote “God,” “*The Eternal*,” “the *not ourselves*,” he used these concepts to gesture toward the same incalculable nothing that is a something.

Arnold did not prescribe—nor did he expect the State to prescribe—a method of study:

There should, after a certain point, be no cast-iron course for all scholars, either in humanistic or naturalistic studies. According to his aptitude, the pupil should be suffered to follow principally one branch of either of the two great lines of study; and, above all, to interchange the lines occasionally, following, on the line which is not his own line, such lessons as yet have some connection with his own line, or, from any cause whatever, some attraction for him.¹⁰⁵

He believed that “in each class there are born a certain number of [such natures].” Unfortunately, Arnold did not specify just how many... He might have said simply that “there are born a number of such natures,” some into poverty and others, wealth. At any rate, Arnold does not seem to think that there is anything like a Revised Code governing innate intelligence. And he believed that the development of that intelligence, instead of restricting men to their respective classes, “always tends to take them out of their class, and to make their distinguishing characteristic not their Barbarianism or their Philistinism,” not the accidental facts surrounding their births, “but their *humanity*.” Most importantly, Arnold did not apply the terms “genius” and “talent” to such natures. Instead, he suggested that those natures refer themselves to a “general *humane* spirit,” which is “capable of being diminished or augmented.”¹⁰⁶

Perhaps because Arnold aimed for perfection, it is fitting that his nature was bent toward poetry and art. He was “not especially a defender of canonical art”:

Instead of naming artworks, he defined the type of artwork that ought to be studied in the universities.¹⁰⁷ In Arnold's view, the artwork worth studying was not that which was perfect in itself, but that which *aimed* for perfection.

I have called religion a yet more important manifestation of human nature than poetry, because it has worked on a broader scale for perfection, and with greater masses of men. But the idea of beauty and of a human nature perfect on all its sides, which is the dominant idea of poetry, is a true and invaluable idea, though it has not yet had the success that the idea of conquering the obvious faults of our animality, and of a human nature perfect on the moral side,—which is the dominant idea of religion,—has been enabled to have; and it is destined, adding to itself the religious idea of a devout energy, to transform and govern the other.

Arnold acknowledged, “The best art and poetry of the Greeks, in which religion and poetry are one, in which the idea of beauty and of a human nature perfect on all sides adds to itself a religious and devout energy, and works in the strength of that, is on this account of such surpassing interest and instructiveness for us [...]” In his opinion, England had “braced the moral fibre,” whereas the best art and poetry of the Greeks “needed the moral and religious fibre in humanity to be more braced and developed than it had yet been” But he advised that England was “not on that account in the right way, if at the same time the idea of beauty, harmony, and complete human perfection, is wanting or misapprehended amongst us; and evidently it *is* wanting or misapprehended at present.” For “men of culture and poetry, it will be said, are again and again failing, and failing conspicuously, in

the necessary first stage to a harmonious perfection, in the subduing of the great obvious faults of our animality, which it is the glory of these religious organisations to have helped us to subdue.”¹⁰⁸

Arnold’s understanding of culture would “beget [...] a dissatisfaction which is of the highest possible value in stemming the common tide of men’s thoughts in a wealthy and industrial community, and which saves the future, as one may hope, from being vulgarized, even if it cannot save the present.” In short, Arnold’s understanding of culture—which depended for its logic on God and democracy—marked a *pursuit* of human perfection, which is open to everyone regardless of class, and not—as in “a notion of something bookish, pedantic, and futile”—the attainment of perfection, by one class of humans, for once and all. Arnold admits, “To the many who think that spirituality, and sweetness, and light, are all moonshine, this will not appear to matter much; but with us, who value them, and who think that we have traced much of our present discomfort to the want of them, it weighs a great deal.” It is not certain that Arnold never championed a “religion of culture.” However, his writing held him responsible to Bishop Wilson’s rules: “Firstly, never go against the best light you have; secondly, take care that your light be not darkness.” Arnold, “for the most part, broke [...] with the ideas and the tea-meetings of [his] own class.”¹⁰⁹ Although God and democracy have fallen out of favour, there is the lingering sense that it is best to break with class-based ideas and treat everyone equally—and not least the meek. Arnold worked according to “the *social idea*,” as an “apostle [...] of equality.”¹¹⁰ In other words, he was a “collectivist,” who offered “a technology for personal

and social movement,” in the form of “*national*, popular education,” to the lower classes.¹¹¹ Finally: Arnold bequeaths, no summary of perfection, but “the study of perfection, [which] leads us [...] to conceive of true human perfection as a *harmonious* perfection, developing all sides of our humanity; and as a *general* perfection, developing all parts of our society. For if one member suffer, the others members must suffer with it.”¹¹²

Arnold wondered, “But how to organise this authority, or what hands to entrust the wielding of it?”¹¹³ He “looked to the state as the agent of the educational reformation [of] which he dreamed.”¹¹⁴ Arnold knew the “maxim” that

The State, the executive power, ought to be entrusted with no more means of action than those which it is impossible to withhold from it; that the State neither would nor could make a safe use of any more extended liberty; would not, because it has in itself a natural instinct of despotism, which, if not jealously checked, would become outrageous; could not, because it is, in truth, not at all more enlightened, or fit to assume a lead, than the mass of this enlightened community.¹¹⁵

Why and how does the State have this instinct? Is it like the despotism of the American model? Arnold remarked that, for many members of the State, “[I]ndeed the only State they know of, and think they administer, is the expression of their ordinary self.”¹¹⁶ Arnold’s model sets moral perfectibility against despotism, self-interest, property. He distinguished between “State-action exercised by a hostile class, and for [the] oppression [of the middle and lower

classes],” and “State-action in itself.”¹¹⁷ “State-action in itself” seems to refer to machinery but, contrasted with “State-action exercised by a hostile class,” it refers to State-action as it is properly conceived, that is, as a means toward some good. To explain: Arnold advised that, when the State is “called to protect the Park railings, and to suppress the London roughs,” it has two responses from which to choose. The first of them is “in behalf of [members’] own ordinary self.” But only the second response, which is “in behalf of the best self of both of themselves and of all of us in the future”—in the common interest and not in self-interest—is legitimate. As well, Arnold advised that the State may not legitimately respond in behalf of “jealous classes, checks, and a deadlock.”¹¹⁸ According to a “foreign Report,” “*Le Gouvernement ne représente pas un intérêt particulier, distinct, puisqu’il est au contraire la plus haute et la plus sincère expression de tous les intérêts généraux du pays.*”¹¹⁹ Roughly translated into English, the Government does not represent any individual, distinct interest, because to do so is contrary to the highest and most sincere expression of all of the general interests of the country. In other words, the government can only illegitimately represent any individual, distinct interest, because its legitimate task is to act in accordance with the highest and most sincere expression of the populace, that is, in accordance with their shared interests as the people. The foreign report and Arnold agreed. Arnold suggested, “All of us”—members of State or citizens—“[...] imagine happiness to consist in doing what one’s ordinary self likes. What one’s ordinary self likes differs according to the class to which one belongs, and has its severer and its lighter side; always, however, remaining machinery, and nothing more.”

Likes and wants are machinery. Arnold did not claim that the State functioned perfectly, but that it was “the power most representing the right reason of the nation,” and, for that reason, “most worthy [...] of ruling,—of exercising, when circumstances require it, authority over us all.” Arnold supposed that it was only from out of “the appointed frame and prepared vessel of our best self, and, for the future, our best self’s powerful, beneficent and sacred expression and organ,” that social equality could emerge. Arnold believed that the State was appointed as a frame and prepared as a vessel, not for ready-made concepts, but for an as yet unknown future of concepts. He believed that the State might be “fitted to help and elicit” study.¹²⁰ “[F]rom a State-action reasonably, equitably, and nationally exercised, [the middle and lower classes] might derive great benefit [...] For [them] to obstruct such a State-action, to repel its benefits, is to play the game of their enemies, and to prolong for themselves a condition of real inferiority.”¹²¹ In Arnold’s view, that was the only way by which to “hinder the unchecked predominance of that class-life which is the affirmation of our ordinary self, and seasonably disconcert mankind in their worship of machinery.”¹²²

3.4 Peter C. Emberley and Tom Pocklington & Allan Tupper: What is the contemporary Canadian university?

Pocklington and Tupper detailed how “Congress passed the Morrill Act in 1862, which provided for the transfer of public lands to educational institutions. In this way, an impressive system of public universities was created in many American states.” The American land-grant universities “were inspired by democratic ideals”: They set about to teach many students and to conduct practical research;

“their admissions policies were based on merit [,] not social standing”; they “were [...] created by governments and independent of religious influence,” and they were “dedicated to the practical needs of an expanding country.” The American land-grant universities seemed to epitomise liberality. “The nineteenth-century German university established two significant new ideas in higher education: that professors were researchers, and that advanced scientific research was central to a great university.” In the American land-grant universities, and “throughout the democratic world [,] science and scientific research assumed enormous importance.”¹²³

Emberley suggested that, although America “experimented” with many models of education, *universitas* and *civitas*, and Arnold and Newman, “define[d] the parameters of the education debate.” In other words, *universitas and civitas*, and Arnold and Newman, defined education within the parameters of the concept “liberal.” Arnold’s writings—particularly *Culture and Anarchy*—inspired Hutchins’ 1937 *Critique of the American University* and Mortimer Adler’s “definitive encyclopedia of ‘great books.’” And Newman’s writings influenced Ruth Benedict’s cultural anthropology, as she outlined it in her 1934 *Patterns of Culture*, and Raymond Williams’ 1958 *Culture and Society*. The “nineteenth century ‘linguistic turn’” in British philosophy—in which “language came to be seen as the primary object worthy of inquiry because [...] upon it depends not merely our perception of reality, but reality itself”—also influenced Benedict and Williams. They “refused to give focal priority to a single culture and ‘taste,’” to a set of great books. Where they believed the “great books” model of liberal

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American university, its first civic decency is toward, not the perfectibility of knowledge, or even the perfection of knowledge, but America.

This thesis is particularly interested in the possibility of a Canadian university, in which masters and scholars can come together to study the humanities, specifically, English Studies. The Canadian universities are an institution with what bedrock? Like the American university, its influences have included the Near and Far East; classical Greece and Rome; mediaeval Christianity; the Enlightenment; and Matthew Arnold and John Newman. The Canadian universities have also looked to “the practices and philosophy of higher education in [...] Germany, Scotland, and the United States.” According to Pocklington and Tupper, the English and American models have influenced the Canadian universities in no simple way. The classic English model “exerted a powerful impact on Canadians’ thinking about higher education,” not least because the Oxbridge universities were “the prime source of faculty members for Canadian universities until well into the twentieth century.”¹²⁶

But “[a] century ago, Canada had a handful of colleges and universities with modest enrolments.” Even “[f]ifty years ago, Canadian universities were [...] unassuming institutions with small enrolments, limited research activity, and narrow ambitions. The Canadian universities were faced with the task of defining themselves as such, and “in relation to government, organized religion, and the broader society.” The classic English model conveyed a “powerful [...] vision of what a university *should* be.” But Canada had something in common with America. Both were “shaped by changing democratic ideals, by the imperatives of

an expanding economy, and by the forces of bureaucracy and urbanization.” More to the point, both were “bent on territorial expansion”—albeit in opposing directions—“economic growth, and the establishment of political orders different from Europe.” In the United States,

[t]he Second World War saw an impressive expansion of scientific endeavour and achievement [...] America’s military and industrial prowess was fuelled by scientific and research capacity. Governments in the United States launched major national programs of research in defence-related areas, health, and general science. To an unprecedented degree, America’s universities became wedded to the federal government and to the pursuit of complex scientific research in the national interest.

The American “land grant legacy” seemed to model innovation, to be adaptable to visions of what non-English universities *might possibly* be. Thus “the American research university [became] the ideal to which Canadian universities aspired.”¹²⁷

After the Second World War, the Canadian federal government made provisions for soldiers to attend Canadian universities.¹²⁸ “The number of students enrolled grew substantially. Women were admitted in record numbers and began to make their presence felt in law and engineering [...] New universities were created throughout Canada.” As well, “new programs were created and existing ones expanded.” It is fair enough to say that, “[b]y the 1960s, the foundations of the modern Canadian university had been built.”¹²⁹ In 1996, “Canada commit[ted] more to postsecondary education than any other OECD country, to the tune of 2.6 percent of its gross domestic product.” Her “ninety degree-granting institutions

receive[d] \$9.8 billion in subsidies annually, of which \$2.6 billion make up federal grants to the provinces.” More than “two million students [had shared] \$8 billion of student loans.” “In the last decade [of the twentieth century], a 30 percent increase in university enrolment [...] translated into the fact that 900,000 students, or 20 percent of Canadians between 18 and 25, [were] registered in Canada’s colleges and universities.” “In 1992, 120,000 bachelor’s and first professional degrees, 18,000 master’s degrees and 3,100 doctorates were awarded.”¹³⁰ The university, “for decades a private institution with limited public purposes,” has become in Canada “a public body linked with governments.” In other words, “[g]overnment funding,” by “provid[ing] Canadian universities with financial stability,” has “also guaranteed that the academy’s priorities [are] shaped by democratic politics and economic needs.” The university has been transformed, in Canada, “into a ‘public utility,’” that is, a tool for “economic [...] and personal development.”¹³¹

But the Canadian universities have too much in common with the American land-grant universities: “The Government of Canada became committed to the support of university research in science, engineering, medicine, and, to a lesser degree, arts, social sciences, and humanities” because to do so “was compatible with its broader interests in national economic development.” Simply put, “decent public universities with open admission policies were good politics and a major investment in economic development. A well-educated workforce was a productive one, and an expanding industrial economy required a solid research base.”¹³² The Canadian government made provisions, in all senses of the word:

The Federal Provincial Arrangement Act of 1967 “provided that federal funds for post-secondary education should be channeled through the provinces rather than directly allotted to the institutions,” and Acts of Parliament in 1976 and 1984 further provided that education and medical and hospital insurance should come under ““block funding.”” Canada’s Constitution—repatriated in 1982—put it to each of the provincial governments to allocate block funding, not as called for, but more or less “as it pleases.”¹³³ Although the sheer number and diversity of Canadians educated post-1945 has been greater than would have been possible otherwise, the provincial governments have been “underfunding” universities from about 1985 onward.¹³⁴ The Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and New Brunswick governments all “announced major cuts (up to \$400 million in each province) in funding grants to universities and closure of professional programs,” in 1994 and ’95.¹³⁵ It seems that the provincial governments have been pleased—more basically than to sanction the public pursuit of knowledge—to facilitate the transfer of information from the universities to as many students as is feasible at any given time, in the interest of economic growth.¹³⁶ The result is that, “behind the façade of ivied gothic spires and tweed-and-pipe-tobacco professors, [...] one of Canada’s most venerable institutions—the university—is under siege [...] The institution itself is on the verge of financial, spiritual and political collapse.”¹³⁷

There has been very little “healthy and [...] creative” attempt to understand “the modern [Canadian] university [as it is] comprised of the [...] tension between *universitas* and *civitas*, between certain outcomes as one goal and adventures as another.”¹³⁸ The Canadian universities have been so keen on

modelling themselves respectable in American terms that they have “seldom probed” their “broader purposes” as universities, and their relationship to one another as Canadian universities, “thoroughly and critically.”¹³⁹ “Until recently, hardly any national debate” about Canadian education “has transpired.”¹⁴⁰ “The Canadian universities are,” perhaps, “worse off” than any other because “[n]o distinctively Canadian ideas have emerged about the role of the university, the deeper purposes of higher education, or intellectual life in general.”¹⁴¹ Some brains consider it “curious” that there have been “few attempts to document systematically what is happening [,] or to explain it theoretically,” considering “the predisposition of [critics] towards working on and explaining other people’s lives and worlds.” Those brains wonder if critics—having discovered that their world is evidently not interesting enough to governments to warrant consistent funding—do not believe that their world is “interesting enough to warrant investigation” at all.¹⁴²

But the Canadian universities have not been forbidden to rethink how they do things: They have been free to choose among looking for new sources of funding; increasing their fees; decreasing their enrolments; and redefining their mandates.¹⁴³ Emberley added to that list, requiring the alumnus to gift a regular sum of money to the university at which he or she took his or her undergraduate degree.¹⁴⁴ There are many possible reasons that the universities’ have chosen to maintain the status quo. One—and it does honour to the universities—is that every alternative to provincial funding risks returning them to self-sufficiency at the moral expense of those students whose families cannot afford to pay tuition

(or, higher tuition) without aid.¹⁴⁵ Although tuition increases as provincial funding decreases, it remains lower than if there were no provincial funding at all. But, perhaps, the lack of debate owes, not to ignorance, but to convenience. A second, and more likely, explanation has to do with the universities' always having been businesses. None of the alternatives to provincial funding—even in combination—can promise the universities' current profits. It makes fiscal sense for the universities to depend on funding from the provincial governments, even if that funding is smaller and more inconsistent than would be ideal. Providing for more students amounts to providing the universities, not only with more tuition, but also with more funding.

Where there is debate about liberal education, it is not genuine. It is “not being conducted by those who know and love the university well, as Matthew Arnold would have had it.” It is not “an expression of detached reflection on the idea of the university.”¹⁴⁶ It is “seldom probing or philosophical.”¹⁴⁷ Instead, the debate takes the form of “*turf wars*,” in which “competitors”—who “see their fortunes tied to who controls the university”—“jockey [...] for power and control.”¹⁴⁸ Pocklington and Tupper suggest that the debate is “increasingly dominated by the universities themselves, which skilfully argue their case. Universities in this country are poorly understood by citizens, by their students past and present, by media, by governments [,] and even by those who work within them.” The Canadian “universities [...] sail on seas of unwarranted deference.”¹⁴⁹ Baha Abu-Laban “applaud[ed] governments’ efforts to make Canada more competitive,” and agreed with them “that the university [...] can

and should play an important role in the process of economic renewal.”¹⁵⁰ The idea is that the more closely Canada’s universities are linked to economic renewal, the more likely they are to profit students as well as administrators. Indeed, according to 1996 statistics, “twenty-six percent of all Canadian research and development [was] done by universities,” so that there was room for “[a] total of 61 845 full- and part-time faculty and 25 000 sessional appointments.”¹⁵¹ But rationalising is simply a coping mechanism, by which one does not ameliorate a situation so much as make the best of it.

According to Pocklington and Tupper, Clark Kerr’s term “multiversity” describes—perhaps more accurately than the American universities—the Canadian universities, as “a series of specialized factions, disciplines, students, and research interests united only by occupancy of a common territory called the campus.”¹⁵²

3.5 The Natural Sciences in Canada

The natural sciences might be viewed as conducting practical research, research about how things do function and not how they might function. But, strictly speaking, the natural sciences distinguish between two kinds of research, the theoretical, or speculative, and the practical, or operative. “Applied science” is a modern term, whose meaning is not rigidly designated: In some cases, it refers to a third kind of research; in others—notably, much of the work on the state of research in the universities—it refers to practical research, and “pure,” or basic, science, to theoretical research.¹⁵³ Abu-Laban on the ideal relationship between applied and basic research:

‘Research, both basic and applied, is a strength of the University of Alberta. One is strongly linked to the other and for one to flourish so must the other. *An essential balance must exist between the two.* Applied research depends on and flows from basic research and vice versa. The University encourages and rewards research of both types [and] seeks to transfer to the community new opportunities, from basic to applied, and seeks to establish new linkages with private and public sectors for the advantage of all parties concerned. The goal is to foster an environment in which the competitive strengths of society in Alberta, and Canada, will grow.’¹⁵⁴

Regardless of the relationship between basic and applied research—regardless of every best intention—there is a discrepancy between policy and practice, in the natural sciences, not only at the University of Alberta, but at universities across Canada. George Grant suggests that “dominant classes” base university curricula on “what they think is important to be known.”¹⁵⁵ Speaking precisely, “the Canadian universities have been closely linked to the national economy, especially since the end of the Second World War. They are Canada’s primary source of skilled scientific and medical personnel. University research, both basic and applied, in science [...] is a recognized determinant of Canada’s economic prowess.”¹⁵⁶ The provincial governments have not been allocating funding to the universities in order to enable the pursuit of knowledge in any of its various forms. Instead, they have been interested in education as the pursuit of everyday life, only insofar as it “facilitate[s] the production of personnel necessary to [...]

society.”¹⁵⁷ And “advanced applied scientific [research].”¹⁵⁸ Whether or not basic and applied research are linked to one another is quite beside the point, which is instead that applied research alone is flourishing, in the sense of drawing from and contributing to the economy, while basic research and “intellectual excellence, free inquiry and scientific imagination may be at risk.”¹⁵⁹

3.6 The Humanities in Canada

However, the natural sciences continue to have the most disciplinary power within the university. Elsewhere, there is what Timothy Bahti calls “an injury of values or of evaluation”: that is, “one part of the academic body becomes the *locus* of a promise of greatly increased values, while another part suffers an attack against its ostensible undervaluing or devaluing of values.”¹⁶⁰ The university endorses the use of the scientific method, mainly in producing applied research, so that the humanities must frame their defence in one of two ways, both of which operate, more or less, in the terms of the natural sciences. First: The humanities defend, off and on, that the university is “very far from having perceived all of the useful potential of [basic] research in the humanities and social sciences [translation mine].”¹⁶¹ Second: The humanities regularly defend themselves by attempting to “outdo” the natural sciences, in more ways than one. Instead of studying human thought as an end in itself, the humanities have adapted the social sciences’ methodologies to the study of human thought, in such a way as, presumably, to produce applied research without the use of statistics and studies, and yet, by revealing the apparently natural as inherently political, to “prove” their interest in democratic education. “Social engineering [...] is so much easier

to understand and to rally behind than the elusive processes of higher learning.”¹⁶² Professors in the humanities have “embrac[ed] scientific management technologies”—that is, they have “packaged [...] curriculum [...] into foolproof instruction kits, complete with clearly stated study methodologies, objectives, and means of assessment”—“as a way of securing more control over their work.”¹⁶³ In this way, the liberal arts maintain their respectability as such, not to mention their respective funded positions within the university.

However, the situation in the humanities is intensified, so that intellectual excellence, free inquiry are at risk: Disciplines in the humanities all continue to engage in some study of human thought, which study can only be classed as either “basic” or “applied” inaccurately.¹⁶⁴ That non-scientific research can more accurately be classed as “poietic.”¹⁶⁵ Research in the natural sciences might maintain “significance for the best professors and students” because of its continued experimentation, its continued testing of present and past hypotheses, but wherever the humanities attempt to conduct applied research, they “can less and less be seen as having any significance by the best professors and students” because they critique historical sources, so that the past can be nothing more than an object of study.¹⁶⁶ According to some, applied research in the humanities “alienates teacher from student, and student from teacher,” and effectively “disengage[s] students,” with few benefits” in- and outside of the classroom.¹⁶⁷

Emberley’s understanding of the university is that it is “an institution formed to cultivate intellectual and spiritual passion, discerning moral judgment, imagination and the methodic discipline associated with scientific research.” He

suggested that it is “in its capacity to question prevailing social practices and to stimulate intellectual knowing and moral doing that transcend the immediate practicalities of the world” that “the university serves society.” But to state that the university has been “formed” in such a way as to have the “capacity to question prevailing social practices and to stimulate intellectual knowing and moral doing” is not the same as to state that it works to capacity. The provincial governments are willing to subordinate abstract notions of the individual’s educational needs to whatever is the federations’ present economic need for an educated citizenry. And the universities, “being required to see themselves as ‘engines of economic growth,’ as ‘training centres,’ as the ‘cutting edge’ of research and development,” put pressure on the disciplines.¹⁶⁸

Undergraduate programs and teaching [...] take a back seat to graduate studies and research as university priorities [...] When challenged by critics, advocates [find] a clever way to wash away a clash of priorities between research and undergraduate students [:] in American universities, faculty research inspired the classroom. Active researchers allegedly [bring] energy and new insight into their teaching in ways that nonresearchers could not replicate.¹⁶⁹

The Canadian universities have trained students to want things, to ““want the facts [and not to] want to do the thinking.”” But it is not clear that ““just getting a degree and getting out fast [is] going to get [students] what [they] think [they] want.””¹⁷⁰ If the idea of learning as “adventure is closed down, Canadians risk regressing to a self-image as ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water.’ We will no

longer be equal participants in the ongoing renewal of world culture.” Canadians will regret that “the opportunity for having one haven in which intellectuals and scholars can distance themselves from prejudice and bargaining is vanishing” because it is one of the last opportunities that they have to resist Americanization.¹⁷¹

3.7 The Question concerning English Studies

Emberley wrote,

Every fall one hundred thousand new students arrive at Canada’s universities. They are [...] intellectually hungry; they have known or are hoping to know love; they fear or revere or are indifferent to their gods; many have seen or heard about death; individually, they are tasting of that absolute freedom which is given to human beings to enjoy; they have all suffered some injustice at the hands of the stronger; they have encountered mercy and charity and forgiveness; they have nearly all appreciated in one form or another the essential mystery of being. Their longings are beautiful, inchoate, passionate and sometimes dark.¹⁷²

For literary critics, there is no longer any “mystery of being”: They view the brain, not as determined by, but as deriving from the dominant language. “Hungry,” “love,” “fear,” “revere”... These are words that literary critics view, not as empty, but as too full of danger. The danger in cliché is that it might attenuate to an ugly truth. People might starve, break hearts, have their hearts broken.

The poor King looked puzzled and unhappy, and struggled with the pencil for some time without saying anything; but Alice was too strong for him, and at last he panted out ‘My dear! I really *must* get a thinner pencil. I can’t manage this one a bit: it writes all manner of things that I don’t intend—’

‘What manner of things?’ said the Queen, looking over the book (in which Alice had put ‘*The White Knight is sliding down the poker. He balances very badly*’).

‘That’s not a memorandum of *your* feelings!’¹⁷³

Professors work at eradicating dangerous words from their vocabularies, and the vocabularies of their students, in order that brains might live more freely, more equally, among one another.

But when professors defend English Studies—instead of from the terms of the natural sciences, as one of the humanities—from comparison with the humanities, using the terms of the natural sciences; when professors of English use as little of the language as possible; they do worse than the classic English university. They reduce the brain to

‘Reeling and Writhing [...] and [...] the different branches of Arithmetic—Ambition, Distraction, Uglification and Derision.’

‘I never heard of “Uglification,”’ Alice ventured to say. ‘What is it?’

The Gryphon lifted up both its paws in surprise. ‘Never heard of uglifying!’ he exclaimed. ‘You know what to beautify is, I suppose?’

‘Yes,’ said Alice doubtfully: ‘it means to—make—anything—prettier.’

‘Well, then, the Gryphon went on, ‘if you don’t know what to uglify is, you *are* a simpleton.’

Every fall, one hundred thousand new students arrive at Canada’s universities. What they have known, they are willing to displace. They are hoping to know more. They are willing to explore concepts. They are willing to revere—above their hormones—their ability to play with the English language. Professors and students of English must respect that

‘the reason they’re called lessons [is that] they lessen from day to day.’¹⁷⁴

Professors and students of English must become literary critics who think less mechanically and more creatively from day to day.

3.8 Heidegger’s question concerning language

Heidegger worked at frustrating mechanical thinking—at forcing creative thinking—at every level. He began at the fundament, the relationship between words and objects. Specifically, he began with the relationship between the word “technology” and technology itself. Traditionally, “The essence of a thing is considered”—in a tautology—“to be *what* the thing is.” Heidegger laid out the traditional definition of technology:

(1) Modern technology is a means invented and produced by humans, i.e., an instrument for the realization of industrial ends, in the widest sense, which have been set by humans.

(2) As such instrument, modern technology is the practical application of modern natural science.

(3) The industrial technology which is grounded in modern science is a special province within the modern cultural fabric.

(4) Modern technology is the constant, gradually increased development of the old manual technology according to the possibilities offered by modern civilization.

(5) Characterized as such human instrument, modern technology requires that it be brought under human control, that humans manage it as their own product.¹⁷⁵

Note that these points apply to all technology, both ancient and modern, but apply particularly to modern technology. In the traditional, “instrumental and anthropological” definition of technology, it is both “a means to an end”—in other words, “a contrivance, or, in Latin, an *instrumentum*”—and “a human activity.”¹⁷⁶ In Heidegger’s view, those theses about technology are “correct” in that they “can be proved by facts.”¹⁷⁷ Facts support the general thesis that technology is “a means invented and produced by humans,” and the more specific theses that it is “the practical application of [...] natural science”; that its creation occurs within culture, as a sanctified zone; that it improves on “the old manual technology according to the possibilities offered by modern civilization”; and that humans are ever in control of it.

But Heidegger considered it as being “still questionable whether this correctness even reaches into what is most peculiar [...] to modern technology.” As he put it, “the correct is not also already the true.” Although it is possible, after the fact of technology, to support that humans invent, produce, and control it, it is

not probably true that that is all technology is, that technology has no other relationship to humans. Heidegger suggested that critics, by accepting that technology's essence is something technological, were participating in their entrapment. He proposed, instead of their "merely conceiv[ing] and push[ing] forward the technological, put[ting] up with it, or evad[ing] it," their "*questioning* [...] concerning *technology*." By questioning, critics might "prepare a free relationship to [technology]." ¹⁷⁸

Heidegger encouraged critics to "suppose [...] that technology were no mere means." He asked, "What is the instrumental itself?" Traditionally, critics understand the instrumental in terms of the four causes. Heidegger summarised the four causes—in regard, not to industrial technology, but to a silver chalice. The *causa material* is that matter out of which a silver chalice is made, it being silver; *causa formalis*, the shape which that material takes, it being a chalice shape; *causa finalis*, that end toward which the chalice takes its matter and shape, it being a particular religious rite; and the *causa efficiens*, that person who brings about the chalice, in other words, the silversmith. Heidegger asked critics to consider that they were, by fixing on Latin terms, and almost exclusively on the *causa efficiens*, ordering the causes, instead of taking them together. He asked whether or not the rite influences the silversmith at least as equally as the silversmith, the rite, so that there is in no simple way a "bringing about and effecting" of the silver chalice. ¹⁷⁹

Heidegger discouraged critics from viewing *telos* as being the same as "aim" or "purpose." He encouraged their viewing *telos* as being that which pre-

determines what a thing will become, “that which gives bounds” to a thing. In this view, the religious rite is not an end in itself, but properly a cause, specifically, “that which in advance confines the chalice within the realm of consecration and bestowal.” And silver and the chalice shape are co-responsible as causes. As for the silversmith, he is not a *causa efficiens*: He does not “bring [...] about the finished sacrificial chalice as though it were the effect of a making.” Instead, the silversmith “is co-responsible as that from whence the sacrificial vessel’s bringing-forth and resting-in-self take and retain their first departure.” In other words, the silversmith simply gathers the causes together.¹⁸⁰

Although the silversmith does the “‘that’ and ‘how,’” it is not possible for him to simply do whatever he wants to do, and however he wants to do it. The silversmith, whether or not he knows it, is but one of four causes, but one of “four ways of being responsible [...] for the silver chalice’s lying ready before us as a sacrificial vessel.” The four causes function together, to “bring something [previously hidden] into appearance,” to bring something that is previously neither good nor bad, into appearance. They “occasion” its “com[ing] forth into presencing.” To “occasion” something is nothing more than to “strik[e] against and releas[e]” it from hiding. This is, in Plato’s term, “*poiesis*,” or, “‘bringing-forth.’” Plato considered it as being possible to bring forth “handcraft manufacture” and “artistic and poetical bringing into appearance,” but also “*physis*,” or “the arising of something from out of itself.” Technology is not good in itself. An example of *physis* is “the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself (*en heautoi*).” Heidegger asked critics to consider whether it might be possible to

bring forth “the bursting open [...] in another (*en alloi*).” Specifically, Heidegger asked critics to consider whether the silver chalice “has the bursting open,” not in itself, but “in another (*en alloi*)”—namely, the silversmith.¹⁸¹

The word “technology” comes from the Gk. word *technikon*, which “means that which belongs to *techne*.”¹⁸² *Techne* means “to be in command of something,” in the sense of understanding it.” In other words, *techne* means “to know one’s way in something and definitely in the producing of something.” But *techne* “is not a concept of making.” To know one’s way “is a kind of knowing, having-known and knowledge.” So *techne* “is not so much that which is manufactured, handled and operated” as the setting-forth of “something that, before, was not present as something present.”¹⁸³ *Techne* originally belongs to “bringing-forth, to *poiesis*; it is something *poietic*.” Heidegger suggested that “what is decisive in *techne* does not lie at all in making and manipulating nor in the use of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that *techne* is a bringing-forth.”¹⁸⁴

Both “the activities of and skills of the craftsman” and “the arts of the mind and the fine arts” originally belong to *techne*. To do as Heidegger asks in “The Question Concerning Technology” is to view technology—to view handcraft manufacture and art alike—as being, not truth, but “the realm of [...] truth.” Specifically, to follow Heidegger’s question concerning technology is to open up to the possibility that the silver chalice is, not an object that affirms the talent of the silversmith, not religious paraphernalia that affirms Christianity, but something perhaps more valuable. Perhaps the silver chalice is a “way of

revealing” something hidden in the silversmith and in all those who participate in the religious rite.¹⁸⁵ That “something hidden” has to do with *the fullness of man*. In other words, perhaps the silver chalice has meaning as an object that is put to use, as part of a religious rite, in revealing man as a spiritual creature.

But enough of silver chalices and spirituality. To follow Heidegger’s question concerning technology—to view handcraft manufacture and art alike as being technology—is, not to degrade art, but actually to restore it to dignity. The words *techne* and *episteme* are linked. Both “mean to be entirely at home in something, to understand and be expert in it. Such knowing provides an opening up. As an opening up it is a revealing.” But although a can opener might be said to reveal man’s ingenuity; although a silver chalice might be said to reveal man’s spirituality; although both show man as being more or less at home in the world; and although Heidegger asked critics to consider art as being “a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology”; Heidegger also asked critics to consider that art is, “on the other, fundamentally different from it.” How? Heidegger wrote that, in Ancient Greece “the arts were not derived from the artistic. Art works were not enjoyed aesthetically. Art was not a sector of cultural activity.” Heidegger suggested, by saying that art was not “enjoyed aesthetically,” that art does not exist to be enjoyed, but only happens now to be enjoyed. More to the point, Heidegger suggested, by saying that art was not “enjoyed aesthetically,” that the essence of art is only mistaken, or misrepresented, as being that it is aesthetically pleasing. Heidegger proposed retrieving art. To say that art was not, but is now, “a sector of cultural activity” does not preclude that man is the sector

of art's activity. Heidegger asked critics to consider that art might have the ability, not only to reveal man's various attributes, but also to submit these, in full, to questioning. Heidegger went to the extent of saying that it is in art that "essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen."¹⁸⁶

"However—what does all of this have to do with language?" Heidegger laid out the usual understanding of speech.

Speech is: (1) A faculty, an activity and achievement of humans.

It is: (2) The operation of the instruments for communication and hearing.

Speech is: (3) The expression and communication of emotions accompanied by thoughts in the service of information.

Speech is: (4) A representing and portraying of the real and unreal.

But "ingenuity" and "spirituality" are not can-openers and silver chalices.

Heidegger asked, "In how far is it necessary to talk about the technological-language, i.e., about a language that is technologically determined by what is most peculiar to technology?" Heidegger proposed that critics, though it is easier to believe "the technological interpretation of language as a means for communicating and notifying," question as to "how far [...] there lie[s] in the essence of language itself the vulnerability and the possibility for its transformation into technological language, i.e., into information." He wrote:

It is from the technological possibilities of the machine that the instruction is set out as to how language can and shall still be language. The kind and character of language are determined according to the technological possibilities of the formal signal transmissions which execute a sequence

of continual yes-no decisions with the highest possible speed. Which programs can be supplied to the computer, with which it, as one says, can be fed, conforms to the machine's structure and performance abilities. The kind of language is determined by the technology. Yet doesn't the reverse also hold: The machine's structure conforms to linguistic tasks, e.g., such as that of translation? But linguistic tasks are also in advance and fundamentally bound up with the machine, which requires above all the clarity of signs and of sequences of signs.

Technological language simultaneously threatens "what is peculiar to language [and] the human being's ownmost essence." How? Teaching is instructional, and learning is "a form of feedback," "the control of a system by reinserting into the system the results of its performance."¹⁸⁷

Heidegger worked from Wilhelm Von Humboldt's observation on language: "Language is a world view, namely that of the people who speak it. Language is the between-world between the human being's spirit and objects. Language is the expression of this between, between subject and object [...]. Language is not a mere means for exchange and understanding." Heidegger asked critics to consider that, although language and technology can be mutually reinforcing, there is a particular use of language that reveals concepts and technology as being machinery. Heidegger posited a "natural language," which "is not first invented and arranged technologically," and which "is reduced to, i.e., atrophied into, the mere transmission, the reporting of, signals." Heidegger called that natural language "traditional language." He suggested that traditional

language is the “passing on” and “preservation [...] of what is original, [...] the safeguarding [...] of the new possibilities of the already spoken [‘technological’] language.” In other words, traditional language is the delivery or passing over of that language, that which has already been spoken and that which remains to be spoken. This “lays claim to the human being to say the world anew.” Many will not do so. But it is “the poet’s task” to do so. In Heidegger’s view, “a poem does not, on principle, let itself be programmed.”¹⁸⁸ The poem understands that “ingenuity” and “spirituality” are not themselves good or bad, but concepts, and that concepts are not fixed, but negotiable.

Heidegger wondered,

Could it be that the fine arts are called to poetic revealing? Could it be that revealing lays claim to the arts most primally, so that they for their part may expressly foster the growth of the saving power [...] ? Whether art may be granted this highest possibility of its essence in the midst of the extreme danger [of technology], no one can tell.

But every brain can try. Every brain “can be astounded.” Every brain can use language in revealing that which is hidden. Heidegger wrote, “All ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary.”¹⁸⁹ Language has not shaped the world in which we live irrevocably, nor does it continue to shape the world in which we live irrevocably. Heidegger’s “Traditional Language and Technological Language” was to “serve [...] as an occasion for discussion. This, in turn, shall not instruct but rather teach, i.e., let learn.” Heidegger understood teaching in the following way: Professors

and students are skilled to different degrees, and “teaching is more difficult than learning,” but “the true teacher is ahead of the students only in that he has more to learn than they; namely, the letting-learn.” There is no “adequate determination” of the concepts of “language, technology, tradition,” in the sense that man can think through them to experiencing the present. Man is too focussed on what is, in the sense of what has been. “If we remain fixed on the grasp of current conceptions of technology and of language, then we deprive the school—its task and work—of the determining power that is in store for it, or curtail such power.” Heidegger uses “school” to refer to “the whole school system from the *Volksschule* to the university.” He calls the university “ossified,” and says of the vocational school that it “lags behind with regard to the goal of its work in the industrial age.” The word “university” is “only [...] an apparent title.” Heidegger writes of there being no thing without language and no “genuine” language without the thing. “In a world for which only the immediately useful counts, which strives only for the increase of needs and consumption, a reference to the useless can only speak in an emptiness.” “Needs are determined according to what is held to be immediately useful.” But it is important “to awaken the sense [...] for the useless.” Because although thinking about the useless “yields definitely no practical use, yet the sense of things is that which is most necessary. For without this sense the useful remains senseless and thus not at all useful.” So what is the useless? “It is wrong to apply the standard of usefulness to the useless. The useless has its own greatness and determining power since it does not let anything be made out of it. In this manner, useless is the sense of things.” “If [...]

we venture forth a reflection on the things and circumstances named with the terms ‘technology,’ ‘language,’ ‘tradition,’ then such attempt yields immediately nothing for those considerations which will take place in this pedagogical course for practical instruction.” “In this sense, it could open up a horizon for the insight into the useless, which constantly and universally determines all pedagogical-practical considerations, even when we are not expressly paying attention.” It is important, not to re-define concepts, but to “rethink [...] the current conceptions of the things named.”¹⁹⁰

3.9 The Crisis in English Studies in Canada

Northrope Frye wrote,

As in any other job, certain questions stick in one’s mind, not because people keep asking them, but because they’re the questions inspired by the very fact of being in such a place. What good is the study of literature? Does it help us to think more clearly, or feel more sensitively, or live a better life than we could without it? What is the function of the teacher and scholar, or of the person who calls himself, as I do, a literary critic?¹⁹¹

Frye’s observation that it is the context in which people read—and not necessarily the texts that they read—that prompts questions about the worth of literature and its study is an insightful one. “Vernacular study” was once “narrowly ‘literary’” and narrowly masculine and white, so that scholar-teachers’ function—if that is the right word—was simply to scan literature in English, and to impose some or another “correct” interpretation on students, without attention to the ways in which that pedagogical practice reinforced various hierarchies.¹⁹² Today, “public

policy takes a different view of the bachelor's degree," and the bachelor's degree in English. The bachelor's degree is "viewed as a benefit primarily to the persons who receive it." The academic community is no longer narrowly masculine and literary. Instead, it includes a diversity of instructors and students, and "emphasis[es] the immediate, demonstrable utility of educational programs, often expressed as skepticism about if not outright hostility to the liberal arts and especially study in the humanities." The bachelor's degree in English has had to respond to that skepticism. But it is dubious that English Studies pedagogy has ever delivered "a general public good."¹⁹³

The "claim that [...] English departments are the laughingstocks of their local campuses"—whether or not it is "respect[able]"—has understandably motivated scholars, teachers, literary critics to rethink their role.¹⁹⁴ Whatever are their personal views of literature, they need for the university administration and student body to consider English Studies as being "more than a professional hobby, a dilettante subject." Therefore, professors have accorded their pedagogical practices with "models of disciplinary knowledge regarded as established in other areas, namely, the social sciences."¹⁹⁵ They have submitted to increasing pressure from the universities to stop thinking of that which they do as being the study of literature in itself, and to think of that which they do as being the study of literature as it relates to politics. Professors have resolved the tension between politics and fiction, what seems legitimately, in favour of equality between persons, so that "English Studies" has come to be the newest social

science. In general, they have looked on literature as being good, only insofar as it advances the right way to live. And there is a specific public damage.

At the undergraduate level, professors focus English Studies pedagogy on developing the student's ability to accord with feminist, post-colonial, or queer theory in assembling, into politically correct writing, such evidence of historical wrongdoing as can be excerpted from a work of fiction. At the graduate level, professors focus on his or her ability to synthesise—and, moreover, productivity in synthesising—*publishable* politically correct writing. When that student becomes a professor, he or she teaches her own undergraduate students to be, as he or she has learned to be, “scientific,” forcing fiction back into the political world within which it is produced. And so it goes. At all levels, constant exposure to, without a thoroughgoing literary analysis of, the premise that “language has shaped the world in which we live” brings the student to believe that language shapes the world, from beyond human control and, more immediately important, from beyond his or her control. He or she believes that her ability in writing is proved, not by being imaginative or “literary,” but by serving an approved methodology.

Yet the worth of that approval—and that ability—is not proved. By 1945, “teachers of English could [not claim] scientific exactitude in the questioning of whether meanings could be assigned to words through the intention of a speaker, and indeed whether ‘words could have determinate reference at all.’”¹⁹⁶ And today's professors of English are not Athena: They cannot claim scientific exactitude regarding intention, meaning, words. And this should not be a fault.

Professors of English have not gained, but lost, whatever authority over words they may have had as such. They have lost authority over, not only what books they teach and how they teach them, but also what books they read and how they read them—to the department, the university, and, ultimately, the provincial government. If this renders any benefits to undergraduate students in the short-term, it does not do so in the long-term. Joseph Epstein, a member of English Studies, notes that he “taught graduate students only once, and did not find it—nor, my guess is, did they find me—very rewarding. Their minds were set, they were in possession of a jargon, they had lost their amateur’s (or lover’s) standing.”¹⁹⁷ Where before English Studies was under attack for being unscientific and—what is possibly the worst kind of politics—stubbornly apolitical, now professors hear that their adopted methodology is contra-experiential, and their politics are bookish, “off.” The natural sciences and the other humanities refute—on various grounds—their research *qua* research. Worse, many of the women and men in whose names they have presumed to rip entire poems to shreds, refute their research’s relevance to their lives. And, in their free time, a good number of them uplift themselves by reading and writing fiction...

Harold Bloom does not dull the point: Members of English Studies have become “amateur political scientists, uninformed sociologists, incompetent anthropologists, mediocre philosophers, and overdetermined cultural historians.” He would silence both the “School of Resentment,” with their “supposed (and non-existent) programs for social change,” and the “Right-Wing Defenders of the

Canon,” with their “supposed (and non-existent) moral values.”¹⁹⁸ The School of Resentment has—in a return to the nineteenth century of which the Defenders of the Canon might almost be proud—raised “politics” as the new devouring category, so that the transfer of knowledge between the social sciences and English Studies is one-way. Politics head fiction, such that the latter is—as never and once before—no object of study in itself. Just as surely as English Studies built the canon on white men’s opinions, so, too, does it proceed to rebuild it on those of everyone else. Members of English Studies condemn fiction where they deem it to be impolitic, failing at loving everyone or, at least, everyone presently accounted for. What, then, is left to study?

To premise English Studies pedagogy with, “Language has shaped the world in which we live,” is damaging—because it pays deference, not to a tradition of rigorous thinking, but to one of studied aphasia. There is no worth in professors’ perpetuating a society in which it is routine to sit idly by, taking notes, in a larger “controlled climate” of inequities. This student’s thesis starts off by suggesting that English Studies “[isn’t] working,” and that its members must begin, in earnest, by changing their minds.¹⁹⁹ But it aims to enable pedagogy to function in changing the shape of our world—beyond today, tomorrow, even the course of our careers—and so it cannot simply conclude that professors’ “care” for their students is crucial.²⁰⁰ The task for this thesis is to show that there is something in students about which it is worthwhile caring. So: Fiction is more than the simple assembly of opinions into incriminating evidence. Something in it attunes students to the complexity of, and the *possibility* inherent in, the

relationship between their use of language and their actions in the real world. Something in it attunes students to their ability to write in endless ways, to devise endless alternatives, some of which are bad and others of which are, just for the moment, better. It is in students' ability to devise alternatives that professors might find their most "practical" pedagogical object yet, for its development under care disallows students and professors alike to shape the world oppressive.

In a manner of speaking, English Studies "always was and always will be" something of "an elitist phenomenon." However, "great writing is always rewriting or revisionism and is founded upon a reading that clears space for the self, or that so works as to reopen old works to our new sufferings."²⁰¹ Alice put it a bit differently:

‘A cat may look at a king [...] I’ve read that in some book, but I don’t remember where.’²⁰²

In critical reading and writing—in an English Studies that focusses on great reading and writing—everyone is obliged, not to some particular methodology or book, not to hypothesise or opine, but to question what are better alternatives, to explore, to be imaginative. It is in this way that the shape of the world looms more clearly, and with more possibility, and, above all, with responsibility.

These endnotes follow MLA format. To avoid disrupting the flow of the text, note numbers are at the ends of quotations, or at the ends of paragraphs containing multiple quotations from the same source. In these latter cases, page numbers refer to the portion of the text referred to in the paragraph, in ascending order.

¹ Martin Gardner, introduction, *The Annotated Alice* (London: Penguin, 1970) 7.

² Lewis Carroll, "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland," *The Annotated Alice*, ed. Martin Gardner (London: Penguin, 1970) 21.

³ Lewis Carroll, "Through the Looking-Glass," *The Annotated Alice*, ed. Martin Gardner (London: Penguin, 1970) 181.

⁴ Martin Heidegger, "Traditional Language and Technological Language," *Journal of Philosophical Research*, Tr. Wanda Torres Gregory, 23 (1998) 133.

⁵ Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, tr. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977) 8.

⁶ Stanley Fish, *Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 34. Fish explains what it is to totalise:

Something must always be left over, unaccounted for, open to still another turn of the interpretive screw; were this not so, the work could be said to have engaged in totalizing—in telling (or claiming to tell) the truth about the world for once and for all—and therefore forfeited its right to be called 'literary.' To be sure, literary works are full of propositions of the kind one finds in philosophy or history [...] but [...] either at the production end or at the reception end, propositions and accounts of facts do not come into primary focus; rather, they provide the material, or 'stuff,' on which the literary impulse [...] can be exercised.

⁷ Carroll, "Looking-Glass" 251.

⁸ Carroll, "Looking-Glass" 287.

⁹ Carroll, "Looking-Glass" 287.

¹⁰ Carroll, "Looking-Glass" 287.

¹¹ Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," *The Philosophy of Language*, Ed. A.P. Martinich (Oxford: OUP, 2001) 214.

¹² Bertrand Russell, "Descriptions," *The Philosophy of Language*, Ed. A.P. Martinich (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 222.

¹³ Carroll, "Alice" 67.

¹⁴ Russell, "Descriptions" 222.

¹⁵ Russell, "Descriptions" 222.

¹⁶ Timothy Clark, "Literary Force, Institutional Values," *Culture Machine* <<http://culture.machine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j001/articles/art.clar.htm>>.

¹⁷ Carroll, "Alice" 32.

¹⁸ Carroll, "Looking-Glass" 294.

¹⁹ Carroll, "Alice" 33.

²⁰ Carroll, "Alice" 25.

²¹ Carroll, "Alice" 39.

²² "Philosophy," *The Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, 1991 ed.

²³ Victor Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, French trs. Paul Burrell and Dominic di Bernardi, German tr. Gabriel R. Ricci, eds. Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1989) 3.

²⁴ Carroll, "Alice" 39, 67.

²⁵ Carroll, "Alice" 75.

²⁶ Jostein Gaarder, *Sophie's World: A Novel about the History of Philosophy* (New York: Berkley, 1996) 67.

²⁷ David Wood, *Thinking After Heidegger* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002) 1.

²⁸ Tom Rockmore & Joseph Margolis, foreword, *Heidegger and Nazism*, by Victor Farias (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1989) x, xvi.

²⁹ Paul Farwell, "Can Heidegger's Craftsman Be Authentic?"...81.

³⁰ Alex Argyros, "Narratives of the Future: Heidegger and Derrida on Technology," *New Orleans Review* 17.2 (Summer 1990): 53.

³¹ Carroll, "Alice" 25.

³² Aesop, *Aesop's Fables*, Tr. S.A. Handford (London: Puffin, 1993). 3-17. This thesis has looked at the first fifteen fables in this edition of *Aesop's Fables*.

³³ Hannah Arendt, "Heidegger the Fox," *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, Ed. Peter Baehr (London: Penguin, 2000) 543-44.

³⁴ Peter Baehr, editor's introduction, *The Portable Hannah Arendt* (London: Penguin, 2000) ix.

³⁵ Rockmore & Margolis xvii.

³⁶ Carroll, "Alice" 89.

³⁷ Rockmore and Margolis xii.

³⁸ Wood 20, 62.

³⁹ Carroll, "Alice" 145.

⁴⁰ Arendt 443-44

⁴¹ Carroll, "Alice" 93. The "mad tea-party" does not invite Alice; she invites herself, and proceeds to speak her mind.

⁴² Wood 3, 62.

⁴³ John McCumber, *Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger's Challenge to Western Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1999) 1-3.

⁴⁴ McCumber 8.

⁴⁵ Wood 3, 4.

⁴⁶ Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger and the Nazis," *New York Review of Books* 16 (June 1988) 10.

⁴⁷ Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Could Anything Be More Intelligible Than Everyday Intelligibility? Reinterpreting Division I of *Being and Time* in the Light of Division II," eds. James E. Faulconer and Mark A. Wrathall, *Appropriating Heidegger* 155.

⁴⁸ McCumber 6.

⁴⁹ William V. Spanos, *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature: Toward a Postmodern Literary Hermeneutics* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1979) x.

⁵⁰ William V. Spanos, *Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993) 2.

⁵¹ Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) 10.

⁵² "Philosophy," *The Random House Dictionary*, 1978 ed.

⁵³ Lacoue-Labarthe 32.

⁵⁴ Joseph N. Riddel, "From Heidegger to Derrida to Chance: Doubling and (Poetic) Language," Spanos, *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature* 231, 237.

⁵⁵ Mark Okrent, "Intentionality, Teleology, and Normativity," Faulconer and Wrathall, *Appropriating Heidegger*, 191.

⁵⁶ Frances C. Ferguson, "Reading Heidegger: Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida," Spanos, *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature* 253.

⁵⁷ Gardner, *Looking-Glass* 231 n. 2.

⁵⁸ Robert W. Jordan, online paper, "Multiple Heideggers? An Early, Still Prevalent, Misreading," <http://ereignis.org/csph/Vol_01_winter01/rwjordan.htm>. 2, 3.

⁵⁹ David Farrell Krell, preface, *Basic Writings, from Being and Time to The Task of Thinking* (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993) xi.

⁶⁰ Carroll, "Looking-Glass" 181, 184.

⁶¹ Peter C. Emberley, *Zero Tolerance: Hot Button Politics in Canada's Universities* (London: Penguin, 1996) 27-28, 35-36.

⁶² J. Dover Wilson, introduction, *Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism*, by Matthew Arnold (Cambridge: CUP, 1996) xi, xiv-xv.

⁶³ Matthew Arnold, *Schools and Universities on the Continent*, ed. R.H. Super (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1962) 15, 18.

⁶⁴ Arnold, *Schools* 19.

⁶⁵ Matthew Arnold, *Democratic Education*, Ed. R.H. Super (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1962) 22.

⁶⁶ Arnold, *Schools* 21.

⁶⁷ Arnold, *Democratic* 213.

⁶⁸ Arnold, *Schools* 22.

⁶⁹ Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996) 72-73.

⁷⁰ Arnold, *Democratic* 15.

⁷¹ Arnold, *Culture* 50, 72, 82.

⁷² Dick Leith, *A Social History of English* (London: Routledge, 1997) 13, 48.

⁷³ Arnold, *Democratic* 223.

⁷⁴ Arnold, *Culture* 39, 43.

⁷⁵ Arnold, *Democratic* 226.

⁷⁶ Emberley 27.

⁷⁷ Leith 21, 30.

⁷⁸ Emberley 36.

⁷⁹ Arnold, *Schools* 22.

⁸⁰ Arnold, *Culture* 194.

⁸¹ Arnold, *Democratic* 7.

⁸² Arnold, *Culture* 3, 6, 82.

⁸³ Matthew Arnold, *Literature and Dogma: An Essay Towards a Better Apprehension of the Bible* (New York: Macmillan, 1914) v-vi.

⁸⁴ Arnold, *Literature* vi, viii.

⁸⁵ Emberley 27.

⁸⁶ Arnold, *Literature* viii.

⁸⁷ Arnold, *Schools* 25.

⁸⁸ Arnold, *Culture* 16.

⁸⁹ Aesop, "Cut Off Your Tails to Save My Face!"¹⁰.

⁹⁰ Arnold, *Culture* 16.

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- ⁹¹ Arnold, *Culture* 70.
- ⁹² Arnold, *Literature* viii, x.
- ⁹³ Arnold, *Culture* 6, 16, 41, 47-48.
- ⁹⁴ Arnold, *Literature* xiii.
- ⁹⁵ Arnold, *Democratic* 23.
- ⁹⁶ Arnold, *Schools* 290.
- ⁹⁷ Arnold, *Culture* 7, 46-47, 50, 58, 70.
- ⁹⁸ Arnold, *Schools* 290.
- ⁹⁹ Arnold, *Culture* 44.
- ¹⁰⁰ Arnold, *Schools* 290-291.
- ¹⁰¹ Arnold, *Culture* 50, 108.
- ¹⁰² Arnold, *Culture* 6.
- ¹⁰³ Arnold, *Literature* xiii-xxvii, 3, 9-11, 15, 37, 45.
- ¹⁰⁴ Arnold, *Literature* 18, 25-26.
- ¹⁰⁵ Arnold, *Schools* 301-02.
- ¹⁰⁶ Arnold, *Culture* 108-109.
- ¹⁰⁷ Sean McCann, "The Ambiguous Politics of Politicizing, or De-Politicizing, the Aesthetic." *Poetics/Politics: Radical Aesthetics for the Classroom*, ed. Amitava Kumar (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999) 45.
- ¹⁰⁸ Arnold, *Culture* 54-55.
- ¹⁰⁹ Arnold, *Culture* 6, 22, 52, 72, 96, 106.
- ¹¹⁰ Arnold, *Culture* 112.
- ¹¹¹ McCann 45-48.
- ¹¹² Arnold, *Culture* 11.
- ¹¹³ Arnold, *Culture* 82.
- ¹¹⁴ J. Dover Wilson xiii.
- ¹¹⁵ Arnold, *Democratic* 3.
- ¹¹⁶ Arnold, *Culture* 204-05.

¹¹⁷ Arnold, *Democratic* 23.

¹¹⁸ Arnold, *Culture* 96, 205.

¹¹⁹ Arnold, *Schools* 30.

¹²⁰ Arnold, *Culture* 82, 107, 109, 205.

¹²¹ Arnold, *Democratic* 23.

¹²² Arnold, *Culture* 108-09.

¹²³ Tom Pocklington and Allan Tupper, *No Place to Learn: Why Universities Aren't Working* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002) 22- 23, 28.

¹²⁴ Emberley 36-37.

¹²⁵ Emberley 13-14, 29.

¹²⁶ Pocklington and Tupper 19-23, 28-30.

¹²⁷ Pocklington and Tupper 19-23, 28,-30.

¹²⁸ Henry Miller, "States, Economies and the Changing Labour Process of Academics: Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom," *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*, ed. John Smyth (Buckingham: SRHE & Open UP, 1995) 44.

¹²⁹ Pocklington and Tupper 26-27.

¹³⁰ Emberley 3.

¹³¹ Pocklington and Tupper 28-30.

¹³² Pocklington and Tupper 29.

¹³³ Miller 44-45.

¹³⁴ Howard Buchbinder and P. Kojagopal, "Canadian Universities and the Impact of Austerity on the Academic Workplace," *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*, ed. John Smyth (Buckingham: SRHE & Open UP, 1995) 66.

¹³⁵ Emberley 8-9.

¹³⁶ Miller 44.

¹³⁷ Emberley 1.

¹³⁸ Emberley 29.

¹³⁹ Pocklington and Tupper 3.

¹⁴⁰ Emberley 3.

¹⁴¹ Pocklington and Tupper 3, 26.

¹⁴² John Smyth, introduction, *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*. (Buckingham: SRHE & Open University Press, 1995) 1, 1.

¹⁴³ Buchbinder and Kojagopal 66.

¹⁴⁴ Emberley 262.

¹⁴⁵ A. Whitney Griswold, "The Alumnus as Patron of Learning," *Liberal Education and the Democratic Ideal, and Other Essays* (New Haven: YUP, 1959) 103-06. According to Griswold, the alumnus has the dual responsibility to continue to educate him- or herself and to involve him- or herself in the university administration. The fact that it is—at the least—difficult for an alumnus to fulfill his or her responsibility to continue to educate him- or herself without the government's aid, complicates that notion.

¹⁴⁶ Emberley 11.

¹⁴⁷ Pocklington and Tupper 4.

¹⁴⁸ Emberley 11.

¹⁴⁹ Pocklington and Tupper 4.

¹⁵⁰ Baha Abu-Laban, introduction, *University Research and the Future of Canada: Proceedings of the National Conference held in Edmonton, Alberta, 26-29 April 1988* (Ottawa: U of Ottawa P, 1989) 1.

¹⁵¹ Emberley 3.

¹⁵² Pocklington and Tupper 5, 20.

¹⁵³ P. Henry Van Laer, *A Study of the Division and Nature of Various Groups of Sciences*, Duquesne Studies Philosophical Series 14 (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1962) vii, 68.

¹⁵⁴ Abu-Laban 4.

¹⁵⁵ George Grant, *Technology and Justice* (Ontario: Anansi, 1986) 112.

¹⁵⁶ Pocklington and Tupper 139.

¹⁵⁷ Grant, *Technology and Justice* 114.

¹⁵⁸ Timothy Bahti, "The Injured University," *Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties*, ed. Richard Rand. (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1992) 70.

¹⁵⁹ Buchbinder et al 68.

¹⁶⁰ Bahti 70.

¹⁶¹ Gervais, Michel, "Valeur de la recherche universitaire: de quelques dimensions oubliées," Abu-Laban, *University Research and the Future of Canada*, 113.

¹⁶² Emberley 13.

¹⁶³ Mick Campion and William Kenner, "Goal Setting, Domestication and Academia: The Beginnings of an Analysis," Smyth, *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education* 81.

¹⁶⁴ Buchbinder et al 68.

¹⁶⁵ Van Laer vii.

¹⁶⁶ Grant, *Technology and Justice* 98.

¹⁶⁷ Campion & Kenner 81-82.

¹⁶⁸ Emberley 14, 21.

¹⁶⁹ Pocklington and Tupper 30.

¹⁷⁰ Emberley 22.

¹⁷¹ Emberley 1, 14.

¹⁷² Emberley 21.

¹⁷³ Carroll, "Looking-Glass" 190.

¹⁷⁴ Carroll, "Alice" 129-130.

¹⁷⁵ Heidegger, "Traditional" 133.

¹⁷⁶ Heidegger, "Question" 4-5.

¹⁷⁷ Heidegger, "Traditional" 133.

¹⁷⁸ Heidegger, "Question" 3-4, 133.

¹⁷⁹ Heidegger, "Question" 5- 7.

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- ¹⁸⁰ Heidegger, "Question" 8.
- ¹⁸¹ Heidegger, "Question" 8-11.
- ¹⁸² Heidegger, "Question" 12.
- ¹⁸³ Heidegger, "Traditional" 135.
- ¹⁸⁴ Heidegger, "Question" 13.
- ¹⁸⁵ Heidegger, "Question" 12-13.
- ¹⁸⁶ Heidegger, "Question" 13, 34-35.
- ¹⁸⁷ Heidegger, "Traditional" 138-41.
- ¹⁸⁸ Heidegger, "Traditional" 139-42,
- ¹⁸⁹ Heidegger, "Question" 3, 35.
- ¹⁹⁰ Heidegger, "Traditional" 129-32.
- ¹⁹¹ Northrop Frye, *The Educated Imagination* (Toronto: Anansi, 1993) 1.
- ¹⁹² Heather Murray, "On Garth A. Lambert, Dethroning Classics and Inventing English: Liberal Education and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ontario; Don Gutteridge, *Stubborn Pilgrimage: Resistance and Transformation in Ontario English Teaching, 1960-1993*," *English Studies in Canada* 23.4 (1997): 468.
- ¹⁹³ David Laurence, "The Latest Forecast," *ADE Bulletin* 131 (Spring 2002): 14.
- ¹⁹⁴ Michael Berube, "Days of Future Past," *ADE Bulletin*, 131 (Spring 2002): 20.
- ¹⁹⁵ Timothy Clark, online paper, "Literary Force, Institutional Values," <<http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j001/articles/art.clar.htm>>.
- ¹⁹⁶ Carl Woodring, *Literature: An Embattled Profession* (New York: Columbia UP, 1999) 52.
- ¹⁹⁷ Joseph Epstein, "Goodbye, Mr. Chipstein," *Commentary* 2.2 (2003): 40-45.
- ¹⁹⁸ Harold Bloom, *The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages* (New York: Riverhead, 1994) 4, 487.
- ¹⁹⁹ Pocklington and Tupper 9.

²⁰⁰ Denise Denniston, *Martin Heidegger's Understanding of Language and Its Significance for Education*, diss., U of California at Berkeley, 1988. 8.

²⁰¹ Bloom, *Western Canon* 10, 16.

²⁰² Carroll, "Alice" 114.

Annotated List of Works Consulted

This is a full listing of the texts that influenced the writing of the thesis. Although there are descriptive annotations only for those texts that most influenced the writing of the thesis, this is not to diminish the potential usefulness of the other texts.

Heidegger's Works on Language:

--*Discourse on Thinking*. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.

The "Memorial Address" contrasts between calculated and meditative thinking: Calculated thinking is easy but results in man's dependence on technology, so that he forgets his original rootedness in his homeland. Although meditative thinking is difficult, it is worth practising, as it shakes man from his dependence on technology, and roots him in his artworks. The fictitious "Conversation On a Country Path" demonstrates how meditative thinking entails releasing objects, so that they can present themselves, whereas calculated thinking entails re-presenting objects.

--*Poetry, Language, Thought*. Tr. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Perennial, 2001.

--"The Origin of the Work of Art." *Basic Writings, from Being and Time to The Task of Thinking*.

Ed. Krell, David Farrell. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993. 143-212.

Art creates the artist and is created by the artist. The poet's extreme familiarity with language allows for, not the manufacture of nonsense or of reality, but the play of language by which reality may reveal itself.

--"The Question Concerning Technology." *The Question Concerning Technology and Other*

Essays. Tr. William Lovitt. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.

Heidegger attempts to use language to question concerning technology, in other words, to question concerning technology without getting mired in the language about it. Language is a technology like any other, except that men can use it to question concerning their relationship to technology.

-----"Traditional Language and Technological Language." *Journal of Philosophical Research*. Tr.

Wanda Torres Gregory. 23 (1998): 129-45.

The technological view of language is that it is simply instructive. Heidegger's view is that traditional, or everyday, language contains and transmits the already and the as yet unspoken, in such a way as to let man learn.

--"What is Metaphysics?" *Basic Writings, from Being and Time to The Task of Thinking*. Ed.

Krell, David Farrell. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993. 90-110.

Heidegger reads science's denial of that which does not exist absurdly, that is, as conceding the existence of Nothing. But this is not to define Nothing—as Being, or its opposite—but the discovery that Nothing is a sort of hiding-place, from out of which all objects advance.

Works on Heidegger:

Anderson, John M. "Introduction." *Discourse on Thinking*. Martin Heidegger. Trs. John M.

Anderson & E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper, 1969. 11-39.

With awareness of the field in which objects lay hidden, it is possible to await, without determining, objects' emergence.

Arendt, Hannah. "Heidegger the Fox." *The Portable Hannah Arendt*. Ed. Peter Baehr. London: Penguin, 2000. 543-44.

Heidegger is a fox: He is given by nature to traps, more originally to resting in them ignorantly than to setting them purposefully.

Argyros, Alex. "Narratives of the Future: Heidegger and Derrida on Technology." *New Orleans Review*. 17.2 (Summer 1990): 53-58.

Computers and atomic energy, but also libraries, the printing press, language, and memory, are technology. Heidegger presents and performs the choice against technology as it is an end in itself. In contrast, Derrida rejects positivism, inadvertently affirming writing as an end in itself.

Bernasconi, Robert. "Heidegger's Alleged Challenge to the Nazi Concepts of Race."

Appropriating Heidegger. Eds. Faulconer, James E., and Mark A. Wrathall. Cambridge: CUP, 2000. 50-67.

It is worthwhile reading Heidegger, not to learn a particular lesson from his political choices, but to open up to all that it is possible to learn from them.

Borgmann, Albert. "Heidegger and Ethics Beyond the Call of Duty." *Appropriating Heidegger*.

Eds. Faulconer, James E., and Mark A. Wrathall. Cambridge: CUP, 2000. 68-82.

One is not compelled to act in conformity with ethics, only impelled to act in a way that is more or less morally defensible. According to Borgmann, Heidegger's question concerning technology is a question concerning the defensibility of standard ethics.

Denniston, Denise. "Martin Heidegger's Understanding of Language and Its Significance for Education." Diss. U of Cal at Berkeley, 1988.

Denniston suggests that Heidegger's philosophy yields a number of pedagogical methods. She focusses almost exclusively on care for the student.

Dreyfus, Hubert L. "Could Anything Be More Intelligible Than Everyday Intelligibility?"

Reinterpreting Division I of *Being and Time* in the Light of Division II." *Appropriating Heidegger*. Eds. James E. Faulconer and Mark A. Wrathall. Cambridge: CUP, 2000. 155-

74.

One's reading a particular text is *only* worthwhile if so doing seriously impacts—*positively or negatively*—on the ways in which one views oneself and the world.

Farias, Victor. *Heidegger and Nazism*. Trs. Paul Burrell and Gabriel R. Ricci. Eds. Tom

Rockmore and Joseph Margolis. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1989.

There is no such thing as philosophy as it stands apart from good politics. Heidegger is a Nazi, and Nazis cannot write philosophy, only propaganda.

Farin, Ingo. "The Question of Technology: Convergence and Divergence in Heidegger and

Jaspers." <[http:// ereignis.org/csp/ Vol_01_winter01/](http://ereignis.org/csp/ Vol_01_winter01/)

farin_article.htm>.

Heidegger sets about to reject both the instrumentalist view of technology, according to which it is simply a means to human ends, and the humanist thesis, according to which it is simply a human activity, because both theses overestimate human beings' mastery over technology. However, Heidegger tends toward humanism.

Farwell, Paul. "Can Heidegger's Craftsman Be Authentic?" *International Philosophical Quarterly*

29 (1989): 77-90.

The craftsman, imagining that the past has no bearing on the present, and the present, every bearing on the future, reproduces present concerns. Heidegger's craftsman is authentic because, appreciating that he finds himself in the present, and will eventually die, all owing to a string of past events, he does not reproduce present concerns.

Faulconer, James E., and Mark A. Wrathall. *Appropriating Heidegger*. Cambridge: CUP, 2000.

It is possible to appropriate Heidegger in either of two ways, by writing beside him, which is not to say uncritically, or by using him as a contrast, which is not to say prejudicially.

Ferguson, Frances C. "Reading Heidegger: Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida." *Martin Heidegger*

and the Question of Literature: Toward a Postmodern Literary Hermeneutics. Ed.

William V. Spanos. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1979. 253-70.

Ferguson negatively criticises literary criticism that pretends to tell the truth.

Freund, E. Hans. "Preface." *Discourse on Thinking*. Martin Heidegger. Trs. John M. Anderson &

E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper, 1969. 2-9.

Heidegger's poetic but clear tone and his avoidance of terminology underscore his philosophy's importance to the everyday world.

Gorner, Paul. "Heidegger, Phenomenology and the Essence of Technology." *Ends and Means* 2.1

(1997): 21-23.

Some critics view technology as being altogether good and others, altogether bad. Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology" promotes a view of technology in which it is itself neutral, and only good or bad depending on mankind's use of it.

Grange, Joseph. "As Technology Advances, Language Decays." *International Philosophical Quarterly*. 29 (1989): 163-73.

The problem with the view of language in which humans live through propositions about objects is that those objects seem to depend for their existence on propositions' referring to them. Propositions about humans' existence do not preclude their existing in unspoken ways, or their learning how to use propositions to speak the ways that they exist.

Harries, Karsten. "Language and Silence: Heidegger's Dialogue with Georg Trakl." *Martin*

Heidegger and the Question of Literature: Toward a Postmodern Literary Hermeneutics.

Ed. William V. Spanos. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1979. 155-71.

Errors in interpretation are inevitable: The interpreter cannot finally distinguish between what he or she is reading in, and what he or she is reading into, a text. An interpretation is, at best, a translation, in which familiar words approximate strange concepts. Heidegger uses deliberately ambiguous language, only in order to minimise translation errors.

Hughes, William E. "The People Versus Martin Heidegger." *First Things*. 38 (1993): 34-38.

<<http://firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9312/articles>

/Hughes.html>.

A "Heidegger" reading group addressed—as an open question—the relationship between Heidegger's membership in and support of the Hitler regime and his philosophy. The group concludes, in this mock prosecutor's closing argument, that Heidegger's politics must have significantly affected his writing, so that it is not philosophy.

Jordan, Robert W. "Multiple Heideggers? An Early, Still Prevalent, Misreading."

<http://ereignis.org/csph/Vol_01_winter01/rwjordan.htm>.

Heidegger would not have one interpret texts simply from within, or without, his presuppositions. Instead, Heidegger puts it to the interpreter to interpret texts, as judiciously as possible, from within his acknowledged presuppositions.

Kockelmans, Joseph J. *Heidegger on Art and Art Works*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.

-----*On Heidegger and Language*. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1972.

Krell, David Farrell. Preface. *Basic Writings, from Being and Time to The Task of Thinking*. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993.

As an editor, Krell works at being, not objective, but as aware of subjectivity as possible. He avoids viewing himself, Heidegger, and texts as capable of perfect communication.

Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

Heidegger's deconstruction of philosophy is not philosophy itself. Heidegger's theses on philosophy are acceptable because, although Heidegger's politics must feature in his writing, it is impossible, without more facts, to determine that they dominate it.

Lovitt, William. "A 'Gespraech' with Heidegger on Technology." *Man and World*. 6 (1973): 44-59.

Heidegger suggests the possibility of questioning via the arts.

McCumber, John. *Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger's Challenge to Western Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1999.

McCumber adopts Heidegger's view of great teachers, according to which they are great students.

McNally, Patricia Ann. "Language and Learning: An Interpretive Study of the Work of Martin Heidegger and an Exploration of the Implications of His Thought for Processes of Learning," Diss. U Mass, 1980.

Okrent, Mark. "Intentionality, Teleology, and Normativity." *Appropriating Heidegger*. Eds. James E. Faulconer & Mark A. Wrathall. Cambridge: CUP, 2000. 191-206.

To appropriate Heidegger requires first that one consider what is the truth, what is the critic's relationship to the truth, and what is one's particular relationship to the truth as a critic.

Riddel, Joseph N. "From Heidegger to Derrida to Chance: Doubling and (Poetic) Language." *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature: Toward a Postmodern Literary*

Hermeneutics. Ed. William V. Spanos. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1979. 231-52.

Whatever American criticism gained by its isolation from European resistance to Heidegger, it has lost by its dependence on Derrida's interpretation of Heidegger. But Heidegger remains to be re-interpreted.

Rockmore, Tom, and Joseph Margolis. Foreword. *Heidegger and Nazism*. Victor Farias. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1989.

Farias' book fails in various ways but succeeds in casting Heidegger's status as a great philosopher, in the sense of a great human being, into doubt.

Rosenfeld, Alvin H. "'The Being of Language and the Language of Being': Heidegger and Modern Poetics." *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature: Toward a*

Postmodern Literary Hermeneutics. Ed. William V. Spanos. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1979. 195-213.

Man might prefer to view himself as using language than as being used by language. But to reduce language to a thing used, is to reduce man to a mere user of things.

Sheehan, Thomas. "Heidegger and the Nazis." *New York Review of Books*. 35.10 (1988): 38-47.

Sheehan refuses to oversimplify the relationship between Heidegger's politics and his philosophy, whereas Habermas and Adorno condemn Heidegger's writings outright, and other critics congratulate Heidegger for having written philosophy somewhere outside politics.

Spanos, William V. *Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.

Farias' book is less an account of Heidegger's anti-Semitism and more that of Farias' own world-view.

----- *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature: Toward a Postmodern Literary Hermeneutics*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1979.

Literary Studies tends to read Heidegger through Derrida. But Literary Studies is beginning to read Heidegger in mind of a crisis of knowledge that Derrida cannot resolve.

Visker, Rudi. "In Respectful Contempt: Heidegger, Appropriation, Facticity." *Appropriating Heidegger*. Eds. Faulconer, James A., and Mark A. Wrathall. Cambridge: CUP, 2000. 137-54.

Ward, James F. *Heidegger's Political Thinking*. Amherst: U Mass P, 1995.

Wood, David. *Thinking After Heidegger*. Cambridge: Polity, 2002.

Concepts are mutable. This bears on the ethical, specifically, philosophy's responsibility to view the ethical, as a concept, as being more mutable than fixed. The possibility of reading after Heidegger entails reading him ethically, in other words, in a way that does not fix the ethical.

Other Works:

Abu-Laban, Baha. "Introduction." *University Research and the Future of Canada: Proceedings Of the National Conference held in Edmonton, Alberta, 26-29 April 1988*. Ottawa: U of Ottawa P, 1989.

Basic and applied research are equally worthwhile, but because their symbiosis contributes to Canada's economy.

Aesop. *Aesop's Fables*. Tr. S.A. Handford. London: Puffin 1993. 3-17.

The first fifteen fables in this edition are those about foxes.

Anderson, Kenneth E. "Meeting Expectations for Research, Teaching, and Service at the Comprehensive Public University: The Dominance of the Discipline." *The Art and Politics of College Teaching: A Practical Guide for the Beginning Professor*. Eds. Karl D. Hostetler, R. McLaran Sawyer, and Keith W. Prichard. New York: Peter Lang, 2001. 29-37.

The university should attend to teaching, not least because an increased emphasis on teaching will result in increased productivity in research. However, professors may teach well, and document that good teaching on their curriculum vitae, only in order to—and until—they receive tenure.

Arnold, Matthew. *Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism*. Cambridge: CUP, 1996.

A liberal education is that which acknowledges the value of knowledge, not in itself, but to men, not as they are motivated by self-interest, but as they are motivated by an interest in equality, under God.

-----*Democratic Education*. Ed. R.H. Super. Ann Arbor: UMI, 1962.

In a democracy, the division between classes only apparently serves the greater good. There must be a system of education that serves truly collective interests, not merely those of a majority.

-----*Literature and Dogma: An Essay Towards a Better Apprehension of the Bible*. New York: Macmillan, 1914.

The language of the Bible—to the word "God"—is literary, gestures toward something fundamentally undefined.

-----*Schools and Universities on the Continent*. Ed. R.H. Super. Ann Arbor: UMI, 1962.

England's primary schools respond positively to success and negatively to failure, both narrowly defined, whereas schools in Switzerland, France, and Prussia demand and facilitate success all around.

Austin, J.L. "Performative-Constative." *The Philosophy of Language*. Ed. J.R. Searle. Oxford: OUP, 1979.

The constative utterance has the property true or false. The performative may imply but never entails that another proposition is true or false. The performative is neither true nor false itself. It performs an action.

Baehr, Peter. "Editor's Introduction." *The Portable Hannah Arendt*. London: Penguin, 2000.

Bahti, Timothy. "The Injured University." *Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties*. Ed. Richard Rand. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1992.

It is worthwhile, not to suppose that the university once functioned properly, or even that it will again function properly, but to view disciplines of study as being in a crisis, in which they are unable to function together, and work from there.

Barrow, Clyde W. *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*. Ed. John

Smyth. Buckingham: SRHE & Open University Press, 1995. 159-78.

To view students as being a market is to subordinate excellence to service, to call excellent only those programmes that cater to students, and weak, all those of low student interest.

Berube, Michael. "Days of Future Past." *ADE Bulletin*. 131 (Spring 2002): 20-26.

English Studies is now less about the study of literature in English and more, the forum in which to indulge in questions about sex and social equality without really answering them. But English departments may yet have a place in the university.

Bess, James L. *Collegiality and Bureaucracy in the Modern University: The Influence of*

Information and Power on Decision-Making Structures. New York: Columbia U, 1988.

Bizzell, Patricia. "The Teacher's Authority: Negotiating Difference in the Classroom." *Changing*

Classroom Practices: Resources for Literary and Cultural Studies. Ed. David B.

Downing. Urbana: National Council of Teachers of English, 1994. 194-201.

The teacher has the authority to set aside questions about his or her authority to dictate the classroom's agenda. The classroom agenda must be to persuade students of values of social equality. Such teaching is not propagandist because it *negotiates* between students' values and values of equality; because it *persuades* students, not of any values of equality, but of society's values of social equality; and because society calls for it.

Bloom, Allan. *The Closing of the American Mind*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987.

Bloom, Harold. *How to Read and Why*. New York: Scribner, 2000.

Readers ought not to indulge in the notion that language thinks for them, or the notion that they think for language. Readers ought to develop their critical abilities, meaning, their abilities to criticise the books that they read and also themselves.

-----*Stories and Poems for Extremely Intelligent Children of All Ages*. New York: Scribner, 2001.

The reader can appreciate his or her capacity for understanding only by testing that capacity, specifically, by reading and re-reading books. Fiction challenges the reader's capacity for understanding because, whereas in reality things must happen in sequence, in works of fiction, and between works of fiction, they may happen in an altogether different way.

-----*The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages*. New York: Riverhead, 1994.

The conflict between the past and the present is irresolvable, so that no particular social class—whether it is a majority or a minority—may successfully go about imposing their beliefs on another one. Literature has no explicit moral or social aim, and functions in a number of ways. Bloom groups Heidegger with the School of Resentment.

Brookfield, Stephen D., and Stephen Preskill. *Discussion as a Way of Teaching: Tools and Techniques for Democratic Classrooms*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999.

Buchbinder, Howard, and P. Kojagopal. "Canadian Universities and the Impact of Austerity on the Academic Workplace." *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*. Ed. John Smyth. Buckingham: SRHE & Open University Press, 1995. 60-73.

Canadian universities have been critically underfunded since about 1985. In order to encourage what the authors alternatively call intellectual excellence and scientific imagination, the universities must become financially responsible.

Campion, Mick, and William Kenner. "Goal Setting, Domestication and Academia: The Beginnings of an Analysis." *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*. Ed. John Smyth. Buckingham: SRHE & Open University Press, 1995.

Instructional design, instead of giving professors more control over their teaching, thwarts teaching, discourages students from being taught.

Carroll, Lewis. "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland" and "Through the Looking-Glass."

Chartrand, Harry Hillman. "Subjectivity in an Era of Scientific Imperialism: Shadows in an Age of Reason." Baha Abu-Laban 183-211.

When English Studies models itself after the natural sciences, it misunderstands art. Art is not necessarily the result of poverty or oppression, wealth or power. Art, regardless of the various external forces' influencing its creation, has always been and will always be the product of human endeavour, depending for its greatness, not on its reception, but on how successfully it marks that endeavour.

Clark, Timothy. "Literature and the Crisis in the Concept of the University." *The Arts and Sciences of Criticism*. Eds. David Fuller and Patricia Waugh. Oxford: OUP, 1999.

----- "Literary Force, Institutional Values." <[http:// culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j001/articles/art.clar.htm](http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j001/articles/art.clar.htm)>. 1-10.

The crisis in which English Studies finds itself is that it wants to be, not a professional pastime, but a profession. And so, instead of defending a pedagogy of its own devising, it defends that it can teach literature in the manner of the social sciences. The crisis is irresolvable: Literature cannot be institutionalised.

Clyburn, David. "Marking and Commenting on Essays." 22nd Annual Orientation for Graduate Teaching Assistants. University Teaching Services. U Alberta, Edmonton. 8 Sept. 2002.

Graduate students are to teach undergraduate students, who will attempt to squeeze a book into twenty double-spaced pages, to impose boundaries on their subject. Graduates are to teach undergraduates that, when their paper turns out not to match their thesis statement, they ought not

to rewrite the thesis statement, but to find a way to show their process of rethinking. Two students in English attended this lecture.

Dalke, Anne French. *Teaching to Learn/ Learning to Teach: Meditations on the Classroom*. New York: Peter Lang, 2002.

Bryn Mawr is a private liberal arts college for women. Bryn Mawr's mission statement refers to the liberal arts as being the free person's free inquiry. But the college teaches women how to answer to the upper-middle class. Dalke developed a reading list of fiction by women, which purportedly answers to her students, and which they have said that they like, even love, for that reason.

Eichler, Margrit. "The Receptionist as Diagnostician: Reflections on the Role of the Social Sciences and Humanities in Canada." *Baha Abu-Laban* 144-59.

Eichler stresses the importance of maintaining a balance between technical and social knowledges.

Emberley, Peter C. *Zero Tolerance: Hot Button Politics in Canada's Universities*. Toronto: Penguin, 1996.

Canadians should look, not to this or that history of the university, but to the university's capacity for reflecting on society's practices.

Epstein, Joseph. "Goodbye, Mr. Chipstein." *Commentary* 2.2 (2003): 40-45.

Epstein relates his own experiences in English Studies: At first, he found that he was free to teach what he wanted to teach because everyone else was interested in deconstruction, feminism, and queer theory. Later, after he had published two articles on how deconstruction, feminism, and queer theory involve a betrayal of literature, he found that that he was free to teach what he wanted because no one was interested in talking to him...

Fish, Stanley. *Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies*. Durham: Duke UP, 1989.

-----*Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

In politicised English Studies, everyone has an opinion on a given political issue. But when a literary critic expresses his or her opinion *as a literary critic*, he or she gains the audience only of other literary critics. And when a literary critic expresses his or her opinion, not in an interdisciplinary way, but in any number of ways disengaged from literary criticism, he or she ceases to be a literary critic. No matter the relative social value of political activists and literary critics, the latter must either love English Studies or leave it. Loving it comes from realising that the content of fiction varies over time, so that what it means is, instead of one proposition, a refusal of rigid designation.

Fitts, Karen, and Alan W. France. "Advocacy and Resistance in the Writing Classroom."

Pedagogy in the Age of Politics. Eds. Patricia A. Sullivan and Donna J. Qualley. Urbana: NCTE, 1994. 13-24.

Although writing entails engaging with questions of language and power, teachers of writing are not equipped to answer those questions, and ought not to promote an ideology. When teachers of writing promote an ideology, students are less persuaded of it than they are persuaded simply to repeat it.

Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language*. Tr. A.M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon, 1972.

It might be possible to view concepts, instead of as part of a sensical whole, as disparate and successively emerging, within a discipline or a group of people.

Franklin, Ursula M. *The Real World of Technology*. Concord: Anansi, 1992.

Frye, Northrope. *The Educated Imagination*. Toronto: Anansi, 1993.

One's studying and teaching literature does not make one a smarter, or better, person. One finds it as being worthwhile to study and teach literature, to study and teach a world in which anything goes, only insofar as doing so promotes one's modesty and tolerance for others.

Fuller, David, and Patricia Waugh. *The Arts and Sciences of Criticism*. Oxford: OUP, 1999.

Fulwiter, Toby, and Art Young. *Language Connections: Writing Across the Curriculum*. Urbana: National Council of Teachers of English, 1982.

Fyfe, William S. "University Research, Knowledge: The Ultimate Resource for Our Future." Baha Abu-Laban 103-10.

The university cannot expect the worth of disciplined study to show itself in six months or a year. As with everything else, artworks and inventions will show their worth in time.

Gervais, Michel. "Valeur de la recherche universitaire: de quelques dimensions oubliées." Baha Abu-Laban 111-18.

Research does not have to be useless in order to be valuable—and basic research is not necessarily useless. For example, the usefulness of basic research in the humanities is not yet perceived. Gervais lists geography, history, law, and political science as the humanities.

Goodheart, Eugene. "Arnold Among the Neoconservatives." *CLIO: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History*. 25.4 (1996): 455-58.

-----"Arnold at the Present Time." *Critical Inquiry*. 9.3 (1983): 451-68.

-----*Does Literary Studies Have a Future?* Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1999.

Gordon-Craig, Christopher, Heather Zwicker, David Gay, and Betsy Sargent. *Proseminar 2:*

Teaching First-Year English. U of Alberta, Edmonton. 28-29 August 2002.

Undergraduate students are the university's clients, and the course syllabus is a contract between the professor or the graduate student and his or her undergraduate students. But the department, by not grading teaching, encourages students to admit to difficulties and work at resolving them.

Graff, Gerald. *Professing Literature: An Institutional History.* Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987.

Literature has always been used in education, so that when English Studies appeared, it was already shaped by and equipped with a theory about literature as an institution, about literature having a social function. The difficulty in organising literature more or less democratically comes from the realisation that some or another majority has always used literature to its benefit (and, presumably, to minorities' detriment). It might be worthwhile teaching, not this or that social theory, but the conflicts within English Studies.

Grant, George. *Technology and Empire.* Ontario: Anansi, 1969.

Education is no longer the pursuit of the ideal life, but the pursuit of the dominant class' life, and the knowledge seen to be pertinent to it. English Studies should return to asking questions, not in order to posit any particular values, but to question values in general, as a category.

----- *Technology and Justice.* Ontario: Anansi, 1986.

Research in the natural sciences is significant if only because it experiments, testing both present and past hypotheses. As Heidegger also suggests, research elsewhere in the university—specifically, in the humanities—is failing to mimic that in the natural sciences, critiquing historical sources, so that the past can be nothing more than an object of study. The correct use of instruments is not inbuilt, but determined in the context of use.

Griswold, A. Whitney. *Liberal Education and the Democratic Ideal, and Other Essays.* New

Haven: YUP, 1959.

-----“Liberal Education is Practical Education.” 7-16.

Reading and writing do not simply lead to the liberal arts, but are the liberal arts. Primary and secondary schools do not teach reading and writing well, so that universities find it difficult to turn out good teachers. However, universities must take responsibility, by not going easy on students.

-----“What We Don't Know *Will* Hurt Us.” 17-33.

In Greek thinking, knowledge aims to reveal the student's critical abilities, and never to reveal truths. In contrast, Dewey's instrumentalism holds truth and utility to be one and the same. The student calls knowledge that which is pleasing, that which apparently reveals truths. Greek thinking founds philosophy, and Dewey's instrumentalism, sophism.

-----“Better Men and Better Mousetraps.” 34-41.

It is necessary to teach teachers, not facts, but that which prompts thinking.

-----“On Reading.” 60-67.

Reading may inspire positive and negative action. Reading may be set against illiteracy induced by technology. Literature is a category, not because it is interpretable in any of various ways, but because it usefully challenges views.

----- "The Alumnus as Patron of Learning." 103-06. '

The alumnus has the responsibilities to continue to educate him- or herself and to involve himself in the university administration.

----- "Further Obsequies for the Grammarian." 107-15.

Writing never produces harmony, but sometimes discovers it: For harmony is eternal, and all that it takes is the poet or philosopher to find it.

----- "The Creative Individual." 116-25.

Griswold distinguishes between what he terms the creative individual and dialectical and technological substitutes. These substitutes are inadequate, pretending special knowledge. In contrast, the creative individual does not pretend to special knowledge, but simply communicates its interest to other interests.

Herideen, Penelope, E. *Policy, Pedagogy, and Social Inequality: Community College Student Realities in Post-Industrial America*. Connecticut: Bergin & Garvey, 1998.

Flexibility is possible only within structure.

hooks, bell. "Confronting Class in the Classroom." *Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom*. New York: Routledge, 1994. 177-90.

Professors who espouse critical pedagogy but continue to view themselves as having power over their students preclude the possibility of critical pedagogy. But it is not power, only what the professor does with power, that is positive or negative... This leaves room to wonder, "How might a professor order, but without reducing, classroom exchanges? Is it not possible for a professor to authorise fully participatory discussion?"

Hostetler, Karl D., R. McLaran Sawyer, and Keith W. Prichard. *The Art and Politics of College Teaching: A Practical Guide for the Beginning Professor*. 2nd edition. New York: Peter Lang, 2001.

Jarratt, Susan. "Feminism and Composition: The Case for Conflict," *Contending with Words*. Eds. Patricia Harkin and John Schilb. 1991.

All of society is sexist, and all of reading, writing, and teaching are complicit in sexism. Many feminist pedagogues believe that they must explicitly and purposefully discuss feminism; others hesitate to reproduce a masculine, or top-down, classroom. Instead, they advocate feminism indirectly, by moving authority around, viewing students as knowledgeable, and emphasising the processes of writing and teaching.

Justiz, Manuel J., and Lars G. Bjork. *Higher Education Research and Public Policy*. New York: Collier Macmillan, 1988.

Karemcheti, Indira. "Caliban in the Classroom." *Pedagogy: The Question of Impersonation*. Ed. Jane Gallop. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995. 138-46.

The traditional authoritarian ignores the personal in exchange for a paycheck. Others do not wish to reduce post-colonial literature to information, or the teaching of post-colonial literature to the transmission of that information. The implication is that it is only the minority teacher, with his or her personal experiences, who can teach postcolonial literature in a meaningful way.

Kaul, J.N. *Governance of Universities: Autonomy of the University Community*. London: Asia Publishing House, 1988.

No university follows Newman's model, allows the professor and the student to connect with one another. As well, no university follows Wyatt's model, is spontaneous instead of purposive, interdisciplinary instead of disciplinary, and anti-elite instead of elite. In Kaul's model, professors and students connect with one another in a specific manner: They have common values and goals, whether or not they state them in advance, whether or not they state them at all; are loyal to the traditional system of authority, and to the university; and value, along with the university, free inquiry.

Kenney-Wallace, Geraldine A. "The Role of Research in Modern Society." *Baha Abu-Laban* 18-41.

Must research show results sooner than later, to one person or group over another?

Koenig, Linda J. "On Becoming a Professor: Identity and Responsibility in the Student-to-Professor Transition." *The Art and Politics of College Teaching: A Practical Guide for the Beginning Professor*. Eds. Karl D. Hostetler, R. McLaran Sawyer, and Keith W. Prichard. 2nd edition. New York: Peter Lang, 2001. 163-69.

Graduate school does not teach one how to teach graduate students. Koenig's choices to become a professor and to teach at Emory University have shaped her teaching practices: She is responsible for teaching her graduate students what she knows, and letting them go on to make their own choices.

Kumar, Amitava. *Poetics/Politics: Radical Aesthetics for the Classroom*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.

It is necessary to revive the idea that reality is constructed, to revive the radicalism of English Studies' pedagogical practises.

Lanham, Richard A. *Style: An Anti-Textbook*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1974.

Although the ideal world is composed of concepts, the real world is composed of words. It is misleading, not to use words, but to avoid using them. Style is more important than content, for concepts can only arise from the play of words.

Laurence, David. "The Latest Forecast." *ADE Bulletin*. 131 (Spring 2002): 14-19.

Where public policy formerly viewed the bachelor's degree as a general public good, it now views the bachelor's degree as benefitting the student. When public policy views the bachelor's degree as benefitting the student, and seeks to increase student enrollments" on that basis alone, this challenges, not only what Laurence calls the principle of the scholar-teacher, but also English Studies and the English department.

Leith, Dick. *A Social History of English*. London: Routledge, 1997.

Whereas the use of Latin and French in philosophy and law promoted the division between classes, English promoted unity between classes.

Levy, David J. "Politics, Technology and the Responsibility of Intellectuals." *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*. Ian Alan Montefiore and Peter Winch. Cambridge: CUP, 1990. 123-42.

Critics have the responsibility to act against technology, instead of to act with it in politicising the humanities, to change the world. Although critics specialise in the use of words—perhaps because they specialise in the use of words—they cannot claim to know the whole truth.

Leyerle, John. "The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and University-Based Research." *Baha Abu-Laban* 523-28.

MacTaggart, Terrence J., and Associates. *Seeking Excellence Through Independence: Liberating Colleges and Universities from Excessive Regulation*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998.

Marcus, Steven. "Culture and Anarchy Today." *The Southern Review*. 29.3 (1993): 433-52.

Martin, David A. *Anarchy and Culture: The Problem of the Contemporary University*. New York: Columbia UP, 1969.

Mayberry, Katherine. *Teaching What You're Not: Identity Politics in Higher Education*. New York: NYUP, 1996.

McCann, Sean. "The Ambiguous Politics of Politicizing, or De-Politicizing, the Aesthetic." *Poetics/Politics: Radical Aesthetics for the Classroom*. Ed. Amitava Kumar. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. 39-70.

Demands to politicise and depoliticise the aesthetic are likewise political, so that the issue is not their instrumentality, but their respective claims to be ethical. Criticism of Arnold tends to be negative, not by virtue of the flaws in his idea of culture, but by consensus. Although Arnold defends canonical art as a general category, he does not list particular artworks. And although

Arnold speaks to a Christian England, that England includes all classes. In this way, Arnold's culture—national and popular education—is possibly a tool for social equality.

Miller, Henry. "States, Economies and the Changing Labour Process of Academics: Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom." *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*. Ed. John Smyth. Buckingham: SRHE & Open University Press, 1995. 40-59.

Canada is a (federal) liberal capitalist democratic state, according to whose constitution the provinces control higher education.

Morton, Douglas. "The Arts in the University: A Major Social Resource." Baha Abu-Laban 178-82.

Fine arts and creative writing programmes emerged in the 1970s, in response to demands from the university, advertising, and industry.

Murray, Heather. "On Garth A. Lambert, *Dethroning Classics and Inventing English: Liberal Education and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ontario*; Don Gutteridge, *Stubborn Pilgrimage: Resistance and Transformation in Ontario English Teaching, 1960-1993*." *English Studies in Canada*. 23.4 (1997): 467-71.

There is no perfect model to which English Studies can refer itself. Defending theory and defending the study of literature likewise inspire anxiety in one.

Naeth, M. Anne. "Leading Discussions: How Do I Get Started?" 22nd Annual Orientation for Graduate Teaching Assistants. University Teaching Services. U Alberta, Edmonton. 3 September 2002.

Anne Naeth is a professor in the natural sciences. She insists, not that her students repeat facts, but that they think about facts. She guides but does not lead discussions, which she believes ought to foster learning. She acknowledges that undergraduate students' have legitimate learner needs, so that the discussion leader ought not to be too impassioned about any given ideology but, instead, to offer a balance of openness and structure. Twenty minutes into a lecture—including this one—she asks what she is doing right and what, wrong. Three students in English attended "Leading Discussions."

-----*Teaching Resource Manual*. Edmonton: University Teaching Services, 1993.

Ong, Walter J. *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Orrell, John O. "Knowledge Transfer in the Arts: The Case of the Globe Playhouse." Baha Abu-Laban 334-41.

The discovery, generation, and transfer of indisputable facts are the biggest contributions to the humanities that a scholar can hope to make.

Peacocke, Arthur. *Reductionism in Academic Disciplines*. SRHE & NFER-Nelson, 1985.

Pocklington, Tom, and Allan Tupper. *No Place to Learn: Why Universities Aren't Working*.

Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002.

The Canadian university is too mishmash a vision, so that individual universities need to refine their focus. In any university, teaching undergraduate students must take primacy over research, if for no other reason than that the university depends for its existence upon them. Two principles follow: First, not every university ought to aim to produce researchers. Second, any university that does aim to produce researchers must remember that the researcher who increases general knowledge—by contributing to other disciplines and shedding light on the human condition—makes the best teacher.

Pocklington, Tom, Don Carmichael, and Gary Kachanowski. "What is a University For?" *The*

Future of Post-Secondary Education. Students' Union. U Alberta, Edmonton. 14

November 2002.

Pocklington: Professors ought to be, but are not, judged on the merits of their research and their teaching. It is up to students to influence professors, who ultimately have greater authority than administrators, to focus equally on research and teaching. Kachanowski: There is no significant difference between research and teaching, so that involving undergraduates in research is improving the quality of teaching. Carmichael: Students should only expect to use the classroom as what he calls a resource for learning, and reflect outside of class.

Plakkootam, J.L., and Prashant K. Sinha. *Literature and Politics in Twentieth-Century America*.

Hyderabad: American Studies Research Centre, 1993.

Rand, Richard. *Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties*. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1992.

Raveendran, P.P. "Politics and Aesthetics: The Apolitical Limits of Reader-Response Theories."

J.L. Plakkootam and Prashant K. Sinha, 9-15.

Where English Studies focusses on interpretation, and not on the text, there is no objectivity—but this is not to say that there can be any number of interpretations. Instead, the dominant ideology fixes meaning, in the direction of their own political beliefs.

Readings, Bill. *The University in Ruins*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1996.

Richardson, Judy, Terry Eade, and John McMillin. "Research Reputation and Teaching Quality in

University Departments." *Tomorrow's Imperatives Today*. Proceedings of the 13th

Annual Forum. Ed. Robert G. Cope. Vancouver: The Association for Institutional

Research, 1973. 144-49.

This study is consonant with other studies on the relationship between research and teaching, finding no correlation between professors' publication rates and students' ratings of those professors. Whereas students know who are the top researchers in the natural sciences, they probably do not know whether a professor of English presents his or her own ideas, his or her own professors' ideas, or ideas from the greater scholarly community.

Rushdie, Salman. "Imaginary Homelands." *Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991*. London: Granta Books, 1991. 9-21.

Imaginative truth is one's political, not factual, defense against held truths. It is no more or less the truth. It is, therefore, possible to choose for one's literary family any number of personalities, and to be honoured by that family.

Sanford, John. "Literature Professor Calls Blind Push Toward Remote Learning 'Suicidal.'"

Stanford University News Service. 2002. <[http://www.](http://www.Stanford.edu/dept/news/pr/02/teaching-gumbrecht213.html)

[Stanford.edu/dept/news/pr/02/teaching-gumbrecht213.html](http://www.Stanford.edu/dept/news/pr/02/teaching-gumbrecht213.html)>.

In this interview with Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, the professor of literature questions the general value of media-enhanced, over traditional, pedagogy, in the university setting. For although media-enhanced pedagogy is useful in transmitting information, he believes that the university's task, and English Studies' task, is to provide a space in which people may address questions. Gumbrecht suggests that Heidegger views thinking, not as something that the brain performs, but as something to which the brain is open.

Sargent, Betsy. *Proseminar 8: Teaching Writing*. U Alberta, Edmonton. 26-27 August 2002.

The enforcement of public freewriting and de-emphasis of grammar are questionable. That said, freewriting explicitly offers students room in which to think out, into writing, any number of their own thoughts.

Savage, Donald C. "Funding of the Humanities and Social Sciences." Baha Abu-Laban 160-67.

Savage is a professor of History (African Studies). Although there is something wrong with the scientific model of applied research, there is nothing wrong with a model of applied research that aims to benefit the underprivileged. In other words, the issue is, not pure versus applied research, but one sort of applied research versus another. It is a question of the definition of "useful."

Seabury, Paul. *Universities in the Western World*. New York: The Free Press, 1975.

Searle, J.R. *The Philosophy of Language*. Oxford: OUP, 1979.

The philosophy of language studies meaning, reference, etc. Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Austin, and Strawson are philosophers of language.

Smith, David C. "The Transfer of Knowledge in the Social Sciences and Humanities." Baha Abu-Laban 272-77.

Smyth, John. "Introduction." *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*. Buckingham: SRHE & Open University Press, 1995. 1-16.

The university's move from isolation to the outside world has entailed a move from independence to subservience. Professors are held responsible, and hold themselves responsible, for performing in a way that benefits the economy.

Spufford, Francis. *The Child That Books Built: A Memoir of Childhood and Reading*. London:

Faber & Faber, 2002.

Books offer an escape from reality to unreality, or an escape from one perspective to many perspectives.

Stenberg, Shari, and Amy Lee. "Developing Pedagogies: Learning the Teaching of English." *CE* 64.3 (January 2002): 326-47.

Tierney, William G., and Robert A. Rhoads. "The Culture of Assessment." *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*. Ed. John Smyth. Buckingham: SRHE & Open University Press, 1995. 99-111.

University administrators and external accreditation agencies, federal legislators, and state educational offices hold the most power in terms of assessment; followed by faculty members; and undergraduate students are more or less powerless. Professors ought to hold themselves more accountable to students, which is not to say that they ought to look on them as markets. The proper aim of pedagogy is the hardest to assess, it being to teach students to learn for themselves.

Van Laer, P. Henry. *A Study of the Division and Nature of Various Groups of Sciences*. Duquesne Studies Philosophical Series 14. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1962.

Van Laer distinguishes between research in the natural sciences and research in the humanities.

Watkins, Evan. *Work Time: English Departments and the Circulation of Cultural Value*. Stanford: SUP, 1992.

Wilson, J. Dover. "Introduction." *Culture and Anarchy*. Arnold xi.

Wilson, Margaret. *University Teaching Services*. 23 Aug. 2002. <<http://www.ualberta.ca/~uts>>.

Windschuttle, Keith. *The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists Are Murdering Our Past*. New York: The Free Press, 1997.

Foucault and Derrida are responsible for collapsing the categories of fiction and non-fiction, so that professors can only delusively pursue the truth. But Farias' account of Heidegger's anti-semitism is non-fiction.

Winter, Richard. *Academic Work: The Changing Labour Process in Higher Education*. Ed. John Smyth. Buckingham: SRHE & Open University Press, 1995. 129-43.

Although it is democratic to view the teacher-student-curriculum relationship as the producer-consumer-commodity relationship, in that it gives everyone some clout, to view the curriculum as a commodity is to reduce its usefulness from ability to marketability.

Wizansky, Richard M. "The Politics of Literature: A Cultural Text for Improving Undergraduate Literary Education." Diss. U Mass, 1991.

Frye writes of the writer's mind that it shares general human abilities. But literary language does not function aesthetically, in other words, does not gesture toward a world of unreality without stating logical propositions about it. The writer is always a white male and always makes false assumptions about others' experiences, so that the text must be studied in the context of history and culture. Wizansky considers responding to changing circumstances as moral.

Woodring, Carl. *Literature: An Embattled Profession*. New York: Columbia UP, 1999.

In 1945, professors of literature would not have claimed scientific precision in judging the meanings of words, in relation to a person's intentions, or at all. Since the 1970s, professors have spent less time in reading literature and more, theories, as though some one of them will prove true. And with deconstruction, came the apparent impossibility of using words to communicate. But where only change is constant, critics might well cultivate what they share.

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